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REPATRIATE . . . THEN COMPENSATE: WHY
THE UNITED STATES OWES REPARATION
PAYMENTS TO FORMER GUANTÁNAMO
DETAINEES
Cameron Bell*
In late 2001, U.S. government officials chose Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba, as the site to house the “war on terror” detainees. Since then,
779 individuals have been detained at Guantánamo. Many of the
detainees have endured years of detention, cruel and degrading
treatment, and for some, torture—conduct that violates well-established
prohibitions against torture and inhumane treatment under both
general international law and the law of war. Under these bodies of
law, the United States is required to make reparation—through
restitution, compensation, and satisfaction—for acts that violate its
international obligations. But the United States has not offered
financial compensation to any Guantánamo “war on terror” detainee,
past or present. Although U.S. laws ostensibly provide a mechanism for
victims of torture and maltreatment to pursue civil actions against the
government, strategic procedural barriers have prevented any detainee
from successfully bringing a claim for damages. With access to
domestic courts unlikely, this Article argues that unless the United
States unilaterally opts to compensate detainees, the only avenue for
relief is through international principles of state responsibility, a
process that still poses great challenges for Guantánamo detainees
seeking financial compensation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Immediately after September 11th, 2001, the United States
embarked on the “Global War on Terror.”1 The United States
military deployed troops in Afghanistan to bring the individuals
responsible for September 11th to justice. Since then, thousands of
individuals have been detained overseas, accused of being “enemy
combatants.”2 And 7793 of these so-called combatants were sent to
the U.S. detention center at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba,4 a site that the
U.S. government unofficially claimed to house the “worst of the
worst.”5 As of January 14, 2015, 122 detainees remain in custody.6
Many of the detainees have endured years of detention, cruel and
degrading treatment, and for some, torture.7 Such conduct violates
well-established prohibitions against torture and inhumane treatment
under both general international law and the law of war. Although
general principles of state responsibility and specific law-of-war
rules8 provide that states have an obligation to make reparation for

1. President George W. Bush first used the phrase “War on Terror” in his address to
America on September 20, 2001. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United
States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1141 (Sept. 20,
2001) [hereinafter September 20 Address]. The term stuck; it was subsequently used throughout
the Bush administration’s tenure. President Barack Obama, however, curbed the use of the
phrase. See Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, “Global War on Terror” Is Given New Name, WASH.
POST, Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/24
/AR2009032402818.html?wprss=rss_politics/administration.
2. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, DETAINEE TREATMENT 57 (2013); see also id. at 311.
3. N.Y. Times & NPR, GUANTÁNAMO DOCKET, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo
(last visited Sept. 9, 2014) [hereinafter GUANTÁNAMO DOCKET].
4. Cullen Murphy et al., Guantánamo: An Oral History, VANITY FAIR (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2012/01/guantanamo-bay-oral-history-201201.
5. Id. The phrase became a colloquial term used by senior Bush Administration officials,
including President Bush, to describe those who had already been moved to Guantánamo. See,
e.g., Scott Horton, Did Bush Know Guantánamo Prisoners Were Innocent?, HARPER’S MAG.
(Apr. 9,
2010),
http://harpers.org/blog/2010/04/did-bush-know-guantanamo-prisoners-were
-innocent/; see also Cheney: Gitmo Holds ‘Worst of the Worst’, NBC NEWS (Jun. 1, 2009),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31052241/ns/world_news-terrorism/t/cheney-gitmo-holds-worst
-worst/#.UwuYg80YzOg (verifying that Vice President Cheney used the term); Ken Pallen &
Peter Bergen, The Worst of the Worst?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www
.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/10/19/the_worst_of_the_worst (confirming that Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld used the term).
6. GUANTÁNAMO DOCKET, supra note 3.
7. See infra Part II.B–C.
8. See, e.g., Hague Convention IV—Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague (IV) Convention]; Annex to the Hague (IV) Convention:
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land [hereinafter Hague (IV)
Regulations].
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violations, thus far, the U.S. government has not been held legally
accountable for its treatment of Guantánamo detainees.
Despite the term “Global War on Terror,”9 there has been much
debate about whether a conflict that purports to combat an
amorphous, abstraction like “terror” is governed by the law of war.
Although al-Qaeda and the Taliban emerged as the clear enemies
early in the conflict10—thus prompting the more accurate phrase,
“War Against al-Qaeda and the Taliban” (WAQT)—an early 2002
memorandum from the White House asserted that the “war against
terrorism” would “require[] new thinking in the law of war.”11
Indeed, this “new thinking” has led high-ranking White House
officials to selectively apply the law of war: they have looked to it to
authorize detention of “enemy combatants,” and at the same time,
they have violated other provisions of it, stripping the alleged
combatants of rights that would otherwise be afforded to them.12 Put
differently, the law of war provides nuanced rules that supersede
conflicting general international human-rights law, while also
granting unique privileges to combatants.13 But under the War on
Terror’s framework, it seems the law of war continues to supersede
international human-rights law, without providing any of these
law-of-war privileges.

9. September 20 Address, supra note 1. While perhaps a clever sound bite, the law of
armed conflict does not recognize “terror” as an opponent in war. As such, this Article’s future
references to the armed conflict will be to the War Against al-Qaeda and the Taliban (WAQT).
10. See Military Order of November 13, 2001—Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter
November 13 Military Order] (naming members of al-Qaeda as the subjects of the military
order); see also Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President, Sec’ys of
State & Def., Attorney Gen., & Other Officials 2 (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Bush Memorandum],
available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/20020207-2.pdf
(referring to the United States’ “conflict with the Taliban”).
11. Bush Memorandum, supra note 10.
12. See id.; Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. DEP’T
OF DEF. (Feb. 13, 2004), http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=99; The Law of
War in the War on Terrorism: A Council on Foreign Relations Debate, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Apr. 14, 2005), www.cfr.org/world/law-war-war-terrorism-council-foreign-relations
-debate/p8030.
13. David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating al-Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 963–64 (2009) (“The law of war takes precedence over conflicting
general rules as a lex specialis during armed conflict, but international human rights law remains
applicable, governing when there are lacunae in law of war coverage.”).
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Since the WAQT began, the United States has not offered
financial compensation to any Guantánamo detainee. Although U.S.
statutes ostensibly provide a mechanism for victims of torture and
maltreatment to pursue civil actions against the government, strategic
procedural barriers have prevented detainees from successfully
bringing a claim for damages. Courts dismiss detainees’ claims or
never hear them at all because of jurisdictional limitations.
Moreover, detainees’ attempts to seek the protections of international
agreements have proved unsuccessful in American courts because
the relevant treaties do not confer a private right of action for
individuals.
This Article argues that even under the more permissive
standard that the law of war provides, the United States breached its
obligations to the detainees and to the international community at
large, and thus should be held accountable and required to make
reparation. Part II of this Article traces the history of the U.S. Naval
Base at Guantánamo Bay as it relates to the WAQT. Drawing upon
existing scholarship, Part III explains the international law and
assesses the legality of the conduct at Guantánamo under the law of
war, as well as other customary international law and treaty
obligations. Part IV summarizes the current options for a detainee
acting on his own behalf in U.S. courts to seek redress under both
domestic and international law, and exposes the futility of such
claims. Part V describes the existing pathway to redress for detainees
when an international state acts on their behalf and highlights the
problems with the existing structure.
In light of the U.S. government’s influence in the international
community and past history of enforcing or condemning other
countries’ human-rights violations, and the courts’ inability to
provide relief, U.S. government officials should reconsider
implementing policies that provide financial compensation for those
individuals who were mistreated or tortured at Guantánamo. The law
requires it.
II. BACKGROUND
In late 2001, the U.S. government decided that many of the
individuals being captured overseas in the WAQT would be detained
at Guantánamo Bay. Despite early promises that detainees would
be treated humanely, the perceived need for increased
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intelligence-gathering led to harsher “interrogation techniques” that
may have been wholly ineffective in collecting legitimate
information. Instead, the techniques caused physical pain and
psychological trauma for many of the detainees, with some Bush
officials referring to the treatment as “torture.” Although U.S. courts
have grown more sympathetic to the detainees since 2002, no
detainee, either released or still in custody, has received financial
compensation for his imprisonment at Guantánamo.
A. The Road to Guantánamo
On September 11, 2001, the United States experienced an attack
unlike any it had experienced before. Within hours, President Bush
declared that the United States was in a “war against terrorism”—a
war it would win.14 Seven days later, President Bush signed the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) into law, which
provided:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.15
On October 7, 2001, the United States mobilized its armed
forces and launched “Operation Enduring Freedom.”16 In the months
that followed, hundreds of suspected “unlawful enemy combatants”
were in U.S. custody.17 Some of these individuals were captured by
U.S. forces. Some, like Mohammed al-Qahtani, were closely linked
to terrorist attacks against the United States.18 But others, like Abdul

14. Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1099, 1100 (Sept. 11,
2001), available at http://www.gpo.gov:80/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2
-doc-pg1099.pdf.
15. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, § 2(a) (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).
16. ANDY WORTHINGTON, THE GUANTÁNAMO FILES 5 (2007).
17. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 62.
18. Memorandum from D.M. Thomas, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Recommendation for
Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for [Mohammed al-Qahtani] (Oct. 30, 2008),
available at http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/63-mohammed-al-qahtani
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Rahim Abdul Razal al Janko, were prisoners of the Taliban who
expected to be liberated by American forces but found themselves in
U.S. detention instead.19 Most, however, were sold by Northern
Alliance soldiers or other individuals to American forces for a
$5,000 reward.20 No matter how they came into U.S. custody, in the
early years of the conflict, many of those who would later be
detained at Guantánamo were swept up in the hostilities, deemed
unlawful enemy combatants, and held in preventive detention.
On November 13, 2001, President Bush signed a military order
that would lead to years of litigation, torture scandals, and a
perceived decline in support from the international community.21 In
the order, President Bush indicated that the country was in a “state of
armed conflict,” a position that the U.S. government continued to
maintain even after President Bush left office.22 The November 13
order authorized the U.S. government to detain non–U.S. citizens at
an appropriate location23 and prescribed the guidelines for their
subsequent detention.24 Any non–U.S. citizen who was believed to
be a member of al-Qaeda, to have supported al-Qaeda in a variety of
enumerated ways, or to “ha[ve] knowingly harbored one or more
individuals” who were either a member of al-Qaeda or had assisted
al-Qaeda, was subject to the order.25 This classification, under the
President’s military order, enabled the United States to detain these
individuals “at an appropriate location . . . outside or within the

/documents/11 (“Detainee was an intended ‘20th Hijacker’ for the 11 September 2001 attacks, but
failed to gain entry into the US to complete his mission.”).
19. Al Janko v. Gates, 831 F. Supp. 2d 272 (D.D.C 2011), aff’d, 741 F.3d 136 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
20. See DAVID HICKS, GUANTÁNAMO: MY JOURNEY 179 (2010); see also THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 34–35 (2013) (“[Ninety-three percent] of those who
ended up at Guantánamo were not captured by U.S. or coalition forces; most were handed over to
the United States by Pakistani or authorities listed as ‘not stated’ when the United States was
offering a reward for terrorist suspects.”).
21. November 13 Military Order, supra note 10.
22. Id. Additionally, President Bush defended his response to September 11 and
Guantánamo in his memoir. See GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 126–82 (2010); see also
George W. Bush, Remarks at the National Defense University (May 23, 2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense
-university (“And so our nation went to war. We have now been at war for well over a decade.”).
23. November 13 Military Order, supra note 10. In the coming weeks, one such location
would be established: Guantánamo. See infra notes 36–42 and accompanying text.
24. November 13 Military Order, supra note 10.
25. Id.
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United States.”26 Moreover, the President ensured that they would be
“treated humanely[,] . . . afforded adequate food, drinking water,
shelter, clothing, and medical treatment; allowed the free exercise of
religion consistent with the requirements of such detention; and
detained in accordance with such other conditions as the Secretary of
Defense may prescribe.”27 Most importantly, the military order
denied all those who would become detainees the ability “to seek any
remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have
any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual’s behalf, in
(i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court
of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal.”28
While the November 13 order never expressly characterized
detainees as prisoners of war, its language resembled provisions
in both Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(“Geneva III”).29 Indeed, Common Article 3, which applies to a
non-international armed conflict,30 mirrors the language of the
November 13 order almost verbatim: “Persons . . . placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in
all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or
wealth, or any other similar criteria.”31 Additionally, a provision of
Geneva III states, “[t]he Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of
war during transfer with sufficient food and drinking water to keep
them in good health, likewise with the necessary clothing, shelter and
medical attention.”32 Although the November 13 guidelines certainly
fell short of the treatment required for prisoners of war—provisions
mandating that the prisoners are “quartered under conditions as
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 57, 835–36.
29. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12. 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III].
30. There has been much debate as to whether Common Article 3 was ever intended to apply
to a conflict like that between the United States and al-Qaeda in the WAQT. Historically, the
provision was intended for civil wars or internal armed conflicts. However, in 2006, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that as a matter of law, Common Article 3 did apply. See
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
31. Geneva III, supra note 29, art. 3 (emphasis added).
32. Id. art. 46.
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favorable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power,”33 advanced
a salary,34 and able to retain possession of their belongings35—at the
very least, they indicated that the United States was willing to adopt
at least some law-of-war principles.
But when the first twenty detainees arrived in Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba, on January 11, 2002,36 there was little consensus within the
Bush Administration about which laws would govern the detention.
Indeed, Guantánamo was chosen in part because of its status as a
“legal black hole,”37 and the unlikelihood that a U.S. federal court
would find that it could exercise jurisdiction over the territory in
habeas proceedings.38 Whether traditional protections under the law
of war would apply provided an additional source of discord among
high-ranking government officials. Senior officials in the White
House, Office of the Vice President, Department of Justice (DOJ),
and Department of Defense (DOD) asserted that there were
loopholes in the Geneva Conventions that rendered them
inapplicable to this “novel” conflict.39 Other military officials and
senior staff at the Department of State expected that previous
detention practices would apply at Guantánamo: soldiers would
follow the Geneva Conventions, and the International Committee of
the Red Cross would have an on-site presence.40 In fact, responding
33. Id. art. 25.
34. Id. art. 60.
35. Id. art. 18.
36. WORTHINGTON, supra note 16, at 125.
37. See Murphy et al., supra note 4 (“I asked all our assistant secretaries and regional
bureaus to canvass literally the world to begin to look at what options we had as to where a
detention facility could be established. We began to eliminate places for different reasons. One
day, in one of our meetings, we sat there puzzled as places continued to be eliminated. An
individual from the Department of Justice effectively blurted out, What about Guantánamo? The
individual then began to make clear that Guantánamo now is an empty facility, that there’s a basic
structure there, that it’s a place that had been used to hold Haitian and Cuban migrants, and that
U.S. courts in the past have given the executive branch great deference in what it did in
Guantánamo.” (statement of Pierre-Richard Prosper, the U.S. ambassador at large for war crimes
from 2001–05)); see also Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin & John Yoo, Deputy Assistant
Attorneys Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Dec. 28, 2001) [hereinafter
Philbin-Yoo Memorandum], available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy//
documents/20011228.pdf (discussing possible habeas jurisdiction over aliens at Guantánamo).
38. Philbin-Yoo Memorandum, supra note 37.
39. Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. & Robert J. Delahunty,
Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002), available at
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/20020109.pdf (discussing the
application of treaties to al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees).
40. Murphy et al., supra note 4 (quoting an interview with William H. Taft IV, Chief Legal
Advisor to the U.S. Dep’t of State); see also Memorandum from William H. Taft IV, Chief Legal
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to the argument that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to either
the conflict with al-Qaeda or the Taliban, the Department of State
maintained that the protections did apply, emphasizing that to declare
them inapplicable could further endanger U.S. troops during
hostilities.41 If the United States disregarded the Geneva
Conventions, the State Department warned, then it was possible the
United States would be unable to assert the Conventions’ protections
if American troops were captured abroad.42
Ultimately though, President Bush’s official stance in February
2002 affirmed that the Geneva Conventions applied to the conflict
with the Taliban but not with al-Qaeda, because “al Qaeda is not a
High Contracting Party to Geneva.”43 Furthermore, President Bush
concluded that members of the Taliban were “unlawful combatants”
and therefore not prisoners of war, and that neither al-Qaeda nor the
Taliban detainees would be entitled to the protections of Common
Article 3, as “the relevant conflicts [were] international in scope.”44
Nevertheless, the United States insisted that it would “continue to
treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent
with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of
Geneva.”45
B. The Rise of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
In the months that followed, however, government officials were
increasingly attracted to “enhanced interrogation techniques”46 and

Advisor to the U.S. Dep’t of State, to Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel (Feb. 2, 2002)
[hereinafter Taft Memorandum], available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/politics
/20040608_DOC.pdf (arguing that the Geneva Convention should apply to the conflict in
Afghanistan).
41. Taft Memorandum, supra note 40. William H. Taft IV was one of the few senior
officials who objected to determining the Geneva Conventions did not apply. He wrote, “A
decision that the Conventions do not apply to the conflict in Afghanistan in which our armed
forces are engaged deprives our troops there of any claim to the protection of the Convention . . .
and weakens the protections afforded by the Conventions to our troops in future conflicts.” Id.
42. Id.
43. Bush Memorandum, supra note 10.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 37–39; see also Memorandum from Jay
Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002)
[hereinafter Bybee Standards Memorandum], available at http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/doj
/bybee80102mem.pdf (discussing the legal boundaries of the “Standards of Conduct for
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investigated the legal boundaries of using new strategies to extract
information from detainees.47 These proposed interrogation practices
were modeled after the military’s Search, Evasion, Resistance and
Escape (SERE) program, which was designed to prepare military
personnel for ill treatment they might suffer if captured by countries
that did not follow the Geneva Conventions.48 The SERE program
included techniques like “prolonged hooding, stress positions . . .
sleep deprivation and waterboarding” in closely monitored
conditions.49 It was intended to train U.S. military in resistance
methods that would prevent them from revealing information or
“develop[ing] a sense of ‘learned helplessness,’” while under the
control of enemy captors.50
However, during the WAQT, the SERE techniques were used
against alleged terrorists with the opposite intent: to break down the
detainees and “ensure that [they] would comply with [their] captor’s
demands.”51 At the same time, some FBI interrogators expressed
legitimate concerns that these techniques would not result in
effective intelligence-gathering, since the detainees might confess to
anything to end the treatment.52
Throughout the creation of the new interrogation program at
Guantánamo, senior government officials assessed the legality of the
proposed tactics. A 2002 memorandum from DOJ to the White
House considered whether the interrogation methods could give rise
to criminal liability under the domestic statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340,53
Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A,” including “acts inflicting, and that are
specifically intended to inflict, severe pain or suffering, whether mental or physical”).
47. Memorandum from Diane Beaver, Staff Judge Advocate, to Commander, Joint Task
Force 170 (Oct. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Beaver Strategies Memorandum], available at
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/20021011.pdf (addressing the
legality of counter-resistance strategies at Guantánamo); Bybee Standards Memorandum, supra
note 46.
48. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 205.
49. Id.
50. Id. Learned helplessness refers to a behavioral “phenomenon” in which an individual
who has been conditioned through repeated, controlled behavior to believe that he is powerless
will “give up,” even in instances where the same controlling behavior is not used. For instance,
“psychologist Dr. Martin Seligman . . . found that when dogs were given electric shocks while
confined in harnesses that they could not escape, most later failed to escape shocks when the
harnesses were removed.” Id.
51. Scott Shane, 2 U.S. Architects of Harsh Tactics in 9/11’s Wake, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/12/us/12psychs.html?_r=1&p.
52. Id.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2012).
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which was implemented to fulfill the United States’ obligations
under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).54 Although government
lawyers consulted the CAT, they did so only to “confirm[] [their]
view that the criminal statute penalizes only the most egregious
conduct,” and to conclude that the proposed conduct at Guantánamo
would not reach a level high enough to impose liability concerns.55
The same was true for DOJ’s analysis of the Torture Victims
Protection Act (TVPA), the domestic statute that provides a tort
remedy to torture victims.56 Put differently, DOJ consulted the
TVPA only to “predict the standards that courts might follow in
determining what actions reach the threshold of torture in the
criminal context” and to bolster the conclusion that “cruel and
extreme physical pain” was almost always a prerequisite to a
successful TVPA action.57 For its part, DOJ focused on the terms of
§ 2340, which defined torture as “an act . . . specifically intended to
inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.”58 It ultimately
concluded that “severe physical pain,” was indicated by “physical
damage . . . [that] must rise to the level of death, organ failure, or the
permanent impairment of a significant bodily function.”59 The
memorandum was leaked on June 13, 2004,60 and replaced six
months later with a new memorandum providing amended
interpretations of “severe physical pain or suffering” that lowered the
threshold from the 2002 requirement and guidance for the definition
of “prolonged mental harm” as interpreted under the TVPA.61 To

54. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
55. Id.; Bybee Standards Memorandum, supra note 46, at 2.
56. See Bybee Standards Memorandum, supra note 46, at 22–27; Torture Victim Protection
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
57. Bybee Standards Memorandum, supra note 46, at 2.
58. Id. at 2–3.
59. Id. at 6. In determining what constituted “severe pain,” the Office of Legal Counsel
looked to “Congress’s use of the phrase ‘severe pain’ elsewhere in the United States Code”—
sections relating to emergency medical care for undocumented individuals and conditions relating
to when the federal government would reimburse hospitals for providing emergency medical care
to undocumented individuals, 8 U.S.C. § 1369 (2012), and emergency medical treatment for
Medicare beneficiaries, 42 U.S.C. § 1395(w)(22) (2006).
60. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 350.
61. Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Attorney Gen., from Daniel Levin, Acting
Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Revised Standards
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constitute adequate mental pain, according to the revised
memorandum, “the prolonged mental harm must be caused by acts
falling within one of the four statutory categories.”62 One such
category included “the administration or application . . . of
mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or the personality,”63 conduct that was often
used and documented at Guantánamo.64 The 2004 memorandum
reiterated the United States’ condemnation of torture as an
“abhorrent” practice.65
Contrary to the Bush administration’s early promises, however,
declassified documents and accounts from various released detainees
indicate that treatment of the Guantánamo detainees was far from
humane. Multiple accounts from released detainees, as well as from a
report from the Office of the Inspector General of the FBI, revealed
recurring treatment, used either to punish uncooperative detainees or
to compel them to “break.”66 Authorized techniques included
isolating a detainee for up to thirty days, deprivation of light and
auditory stimuli, and twenty-hour interrogations.67 Additionally,
interrogators employed two forms of sleep deprivation: traditional
sleep deprivation and a practice known as “sleep adjustment.” Under
traditional sleep deprivation, a detainee was prevented from sleeping
at all. This practice was authorized for use up to 180 continuous
hours.68 During the “sleep adjustment” or “frequent flyer” program,
an interrogator would awaken a detainee periodically, anywhere
Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm (replacing Bybee
Standards Memorandum, supra note 46).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See infra Part IV.C.2.
65. Revised Standards Memorandum, supra note 61.
66. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 205; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S INVOLVEMENT IN AND OBSERVATIONS OF
DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN GUANTÁNAMO BAY, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ 171–211 (May
2008) [hereinafter THE FBI’S INVOLVEMENT], available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special
/s0805/final.pdf.
67. Beaver Strategies Memorandum, supra note 47.
68. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to
John A. Rizzo, Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency 12–13 (May 30, 2005) [hereinafter
Bradbury Memorandum], available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torture_archive/docs
/Bradbury%20memo.pdf (analyzing whether some interrogation techniques violated the United
States’ obligations under Article 16 of the CAT). In the same memorandum, Bradbury explained
that, while sleep deprivation was authorized for up to 180 hours, interrogators had only used this
method in excess of 96 hours with three detainees.
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from every hour to every few hours, and move him to a different
cell.69 Though this second method provided detainees with some rest,
individuals who were subjected to the program were rarely afforded
more than four hours of sleep each night;70 one detainee was
reportedly kept awake and interrogated for twenty hours per day for
a two-month period.71
Additional interrogation techniques included exposure to
extreme temperatures; sexual humiliation, including contact with
female interrogators that exploited detainees’ religious and cultural
beliefs; beatings; and short-shackling—a method by which “the
detainee’s hands and feet were chained close to a bolt on the floor so
that the detainee could not sit or stand comfortably.”72
Short-shackling was frequently combined with other techniques,
such as flashing lights, loud music, and cold and hot temperatures, to
further “break” an uncooperative detainee.73 Moreover, Guantánamo
guards often responded to disobedience with force that “looked like

69. THE FBI’S INVOLVEMENT, supra note 66, at 182–84.
70. Detainees in the “frequent flyer” program were allowed some sleep, but it was minimal.
As one DOD memorandum concluded:
There is no legal requirement that detainees must receive four hours of sleep per night,
but if a U.S. Court ever had to rule on this procedure, in order to pass Eighth
Amendment scrutiny, and as a cautionary measure, they should receive some amount
of sleep so that no severe physical or mental harm would result.
Beaver Strategies Memorandum, supra note 47, at 6. Donald Rumsfeld approved most of the
proposed counter-resistance techniques on December 2, 2002. Memorandum from William J.
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, to Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def. (Nov. 27, 2002), available at
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.12.02.pdf (approved and signed by
Rumsfeld on Dec. 2, 2002).
71. Declaration of Gitanjali S. Gutierrez, Esq., Lawyer for Mohammed al Qahtani 4,
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Publication_DeclarationonAlQahtani.pdf; see also Interrog
ation Log Detainee 063, available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Publication_AlQahtaniLog.pdf.
72. THE FBI’S INVOLVEMENT, supra note 66, at 179; see HICKS, supra note 20;
WORTHINGTON, supra note 16; RHUHEL AHMED, ASIF IQBAL, & SHAFIQ RASUL, COMPOSITE
STATEMENT: DETENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND GUANTÁNAMO BAY (2004), available at
http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/resources/library/documents-and-reports/tipton_report.pdf. See
generally THE FBI’S INVOLVEMENT, supra note 66, at 171–211 (detailing the conduct observed
by the FBI at Guantánamo).
73. THE FBI’S INVOLVEMENT, supra note 66, at 179. According to the report, published in
2008, short-shackling at Guantánamo was prohibited in May 2004. Id. at 180. But see id. at 181
n.132 (“In commenting on a draft of this report, the DOD stated that ‘short-shackling’ is also a
technique used to control violent or belligerent detainees to ensure the safety of others . . . .”).
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some violent street fight”;74 kicking detainees, taunting them, and
using dogs for intimidation were not uncommon practices.75
C. Guantánamo’s Lasting Effects
Omar Deghayes, a British resident and law graduate, spent
nearly six years imprisoned at Guantánamo.76 Deghayes was found
in Pakistan and transported to Guantánamo Bay on August 5, 2002.77
Upon his release in December 2007,78 Deghayes returned to Great
Britain, suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and “[blind] in
one eye after a guard allegedly tried to gouge out his eyeballs with
his fingers.”79 For Deghayes and the other British detainees, the
stigma of their detention in Guantánamo remains: some of the men
have been victims of racial attacks, and the children of one detainee
have even been bullied at school.80
Indeed, the treatment of one detainee in particular, alleged “20th
hijacker”81 Mohammed al-Qahtani, prompted Judge Susan Crawford,
a “Cheney loyalist,”82 to conclude years afterward that al-Qahtani
was tortured by the United States.83 As a result, Judge Crawford did
not allow him to be prosecuted by a military commission.84
Mohammed al-Qahtani remains at Guantánamo indefinitely and has
no recourse for the treatment he endured.
But other detainees—those like Omar Deghayes or Abdul
Rahim Abdul Razal al Janko, whose seven-year detention was

74. HICKS, supra note 20, at 220–21.
75. Id. at 215–16, 220–21; WORTHINGTON, supra note 16, at 133–34.
76. Tracy McVeigh, Britain’s Guantánamo Survivors Are Suffering a Toxic Legacy,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/01/released
-guantanamo-british-detainees.
77. Memorandum from Mitchell R. LeClaire to SOUTHCOM (JTF-GTMO Assessment),
(Apr. 10, 2004), available at http://projects.nytimes.com/Guantánamo/detainees/727-omar-amer
-deghayes.
78. N.Y. Times & NPR, Omar Amer Deghayes, GUANTÁNAMO DOCKET, http://projects
.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/727-omar-amer-deghayes (last visited Sept. 9, 2014).
79. McVeigh, supra note 76.
80. Id.
81. WORTHINGTON, supra note 16, at 205.
82. Cast of Characters: Key Players in the Cheney Series, WASH. POST, http://voices
.washingtonpost.com/cheney/about/cast_of_characters/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2013); see also
David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil over the Guantánamo
Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 178–79 (2008).
83. Bush Official Says Gitmo Detainee Was Tortured, CNN (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.cnn
.com/2009/US/01/15/guantanamo.torture/.
84. Id.
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deemed “unlawful” by a federal district court85—have been released
or cleared for release. Many of them returned to their home countries
(or were “repatriated” to new countries) to find that their wives had
moved on, their children had grown up, and their livelihoods had
been destroyed.86
Unlike any other country, the United Kingdom has provided
financial compensation to its released detainees. Yet its motives may
not be purely altruistic. Upon their release, the British detainees
“sued Britain for alleged complicity in their torture.”87 To avoid
disclosing confidential security documents and participating in
“lengthy and expensive court proceedings,”88 the British government
proposed a financial settlement, but maintained that the settlement
“involve[d] no concession of liability.”89 Nevertheless, the
confidential settlement, rumored to be millions of dollars, was to be
split among sixteen men:90 the fifteen former detainees, as well as
Great Britain resident Shaker Aamer, who, despite being cleared for
release in January 2010, remains at Guantánamo after twelve years.91
Most of the detainees, however, do not return to countries as
sympathetic as the United Kingdom upon leaving Guantánamo. For
many of the men, the only remedy, if any, that they will see after
years of wrongful detention and mistreatment is their release.
D. Emerging from the “Legal Black Hole”
Guantánamo opened for WAQT detainees in early 2002, and
until 2004, detainees found little success in challenging their
detention: “[w]ith none of the protections afforded to prisoners of
international conflict applicable, detainees at Guantánamo were held
under any conditions the U.S. government determined appropriate.”92
85. Al Janko v. Gates, 831 F. Supp. 2d 272 (D.D.C 2011), aff’d, 741 F.3d 136 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
86. McVeigh, supra note 76.
87. Janet Stobart, Ex-Guantanamo Detainees Settle Suit Against Britain, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/17/world/la-fg-britain-prisoners-20101117.
88. Id.
89. McVeigh, supra note 76.
90. Id.
91. N.Y. Times & NPR, Shaker Aamer, GUANTÁNAMO DOCKET, http://projects.nytimes
.com/guantanamo/detainees/239-shaker-aamer (last visited Sept. 9, 2014).
92. Guantánamo Litigation—History, LAWFARE BLOG (Dec. 16, 2009, 9:33 AM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/detention/non-criminal-detention-after-911/non-criminal
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However, in 2004, three “war on terror” cases reached the Supreme
Court, including Rasul v. Bush.93 In Rasul, the Supreme Court held
that the Guantánamo detainees had a statutory right to habeas corpus,
and that such a right was “not dependent on U.S. citizenship.”94
Over the next three years, a battle ensued between the Supreme
Court and the executive and legislative branches. Just one week after
the ruling in Rasul and “in the hope of curtailing . . . judicial
challenges,”95 DOD established the Office for the Administrative
Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC).96
OARDEC oversaw the Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs), which implemented a process of review to determine
whether individuals detained at Guantánamo were, in fact, “enemy
combatants.”97 Yet the CSRTs provided detainees with little
meaningful review. In a sworn affidavit, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen
Abraham, who participated in the CSRT process, implied that the
CSRTs were inadequate and corrupt.98 In one instance, Lieutenant
Colonel Abraham was assigned to a CSRT and all panel members
“found the information presented to lack substance.”99 Lieutenant
Colonel Abraham stated:
What were purported to be specific statements of fact
lacked even the most fundamental earmarks of objectively
credible evidence. Statements allegedly made by percipient
witnesses lacked detail. Reports presented generalized
statements . . . without stating the source of the information
or providing a basis for establishing the reliability or the
credibility of the source.100
The panel determined that “there was no factual basis for concluding
that the individual should be classified as an enemy combatant,” and
-detention-under-the-authorization-for-the-use-of-military-force/guantanamo-litigation/history-of
-guantanamo-litigation/.
93. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
94. Guantánamo Litigation—History, supra note 92.
95. Glazier, supra note 82, at 169.
96. Nat Moger, OARDEC Conducts ARBs and CSRTs, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
(June 6, 2008), http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/storyarchive/2008/June/060908-oardec.html.
97. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy
(July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
98. Reply to Opposition to Petition for Rehearing, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008) (No. 06-1196), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives
/Al%20Odah%20reply%206-22-07.pdf (Declaration of Stephen Abraham).
99. Id. para. 21.
100. Id. para. 22.
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reported their findings to the Director of OARDEC.101 Lieutenant
Colonel Abraham’s declaration continued:
[The OARDEC Director and Deputy Director] immediately
questioned the validity of our findings. They directed us to
write out the specific questions that we had raised
concerning the evidence to allow [the government
representative] to present further argument as to why the
detainee should be classified as an enemy combatant.
Ultimately, in the absence of any substantive response to
the questions and no basis for concluding that additional
information would be forthcoming, we did not change our
determination that the detainee was not properly classified
as an enemy combatant. OARDEC’s response to the
outcome was consistent with the few other instances in
which a finding of “Not an Enemy Combatant” (NEC) had
been reached by CSRT boards. In each of the meetings that
I attended with OARDEC leadership following a finding of
NEC, the focus of inquiry on the part of the leadership was
“what went wrong.”102
Lieutenant Colonel Abraham was never assigned to another CSRT
panel.103
One year after Rasul, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005, which “purported to strip all U.S. courts of jurisdiction
to hear any habeas corpus petitions filed by Guantánamo
detainees.”104 The following year, the Supreme Court heard Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld,105 and ruled that Common Article 3 applied to the “war
on terror.”106 Again, Congress responded and passed the Military
Commissions Act of 2006.107 This time, Congress “wholly
eliminat[ed] the statutory grant of federal jurisdiction” for
Guantánamo detainees and empowered the military commissions to
101. Id. para. 23.
102. Id.
103. Id. para. 24.
104. Guantánamo Litigation—History, supra note 92.
105. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
106. Id. at 631–32; Glazier, supra note 82, at 174; Guantánamo Litigation—History, supra
note 92.
107. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948–
49); see also Guantánamo Litigation—History, supra note 92.
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try so-called unlawful enemy combatants.108 Finally, in 2008 the
Court found that Guantánamo detainees had a constitutional right to
habeas corpus in Boumediene v. Bush.109 Still, despite constant
litigation concerning Guantánamo, there has yet to be a single case
where a detainee has successfully challenged his detention and
received a monetary remedy.110
III. JUDGING THE CONDUCT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although the Bush administration’s internal memoranda
concluded that the detention and “enhanced interrogation tactics”
complied with domestic law, there was little analysis of whether the
conduct complied with international law. Indeed, the 2002 DOJ
memoranda seemed to focus on whether U.S. officials could be held
criminally liable for the conduct at Guantánamo and proposed
defenses like necessity and self-defense that DOJ believed the White
House could assert in the event of a prosecution under domestic law
for the conduct.111 Yet the mere fact that criminal prosecution was
unlikely did not discharge the United States from its international
obligations, under either the law of war or relevant human rights
treaties—specifically, the Convention Against Torture.112 The White
House’s determination that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 did not
apply, and its failure to thoroughly consider other sources of the law
of armed conflict, including treaties with non-derogable norms, led
to new policies that, in fact, violated the law.
A. The Law of War and International Law
Principles of State Responsibility
The law of war consists of both customary international law,
developed over the last several centuries, and a series of international
treaties providing specific rules for, inter alia, warfare, the treatment
of prisoners of war, and the treatment of civilians. In particular, the
108. Guantánamo Litigation—History, supra note 92.
109. 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008); Guantánamo Litigation—History, supra note 92.
110. There have been some detainee successes in court. However, the only cases that Article
III courts are willing (or able) to entertain involve petitions for habeas corpus. See, e.g., Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Al Janko v. Gates, 831 F. Supp. 2d 272 (D.D.C 2011), aff’d, 741 F.3d
136 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But see Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding
that “petitioners’ challenges to the conditions of their confinement properly sound in habeas
corpus and thus are not barred by the [Military Commissions Act]”).
111. Bybee Standards Memorandum, supra note 46, at 39–46.
112. See infra Part III.C.
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Hague Convention (IV) [R]especting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land,113 its annexed Regulations [C]oncerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land,114 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949
provide much of the rules and foundation governing armed conflict
in the present day.115 The Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 (giving
rise to the term “Hague Law”) governs the general rules of warfare,
listing guidelines for defining belligerents in a conflict and
addressing permitted weapons and military tactics.116 The Geneva
Conventions (giving rise to the term “Geneva Law”), on the other
hand, provide a set of rules outlining the treatment for the sick and
wounded (Conventions I and II),117 prisoners of war (Convention
III),118 and civilians (Convention IV).119 Inevitably, there is some
overlap between Hague Law and Geneva Law: the Hague
Convention briefly addresses prisoners of war, a topic that was later
expanded in Geneva III, and the Hague Convention (IV) fully defers
to the Geneva Convention for the laws “on the treatment of the sick
and wounded.”120 Although states may not be parties to these
treaties, they may nonetheless be legally bound by the rules the
treaties mandate under customary international law.121
If a state violates the law of war or any other international
obligation, the wrongful act triggers the state’s international
responsibility.122 A variety of factors, including the source of the
113. Hague (IV) Convention, supra note 8.
114. Hague (IV) Regulations, supra note 8.
115. ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (2nd ed. 2010). Since the
initial ratification of the Geneva Conventions, three additional protocols have been introduced,
but only one has been ratified by the United States. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive
Emblem, Dec. 8, 2005, T.I.A.S. 07-908, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17512.
116. Hague (IV) Convention, supra note 8.
117. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
118. Geneva III, supra note 29.
119. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
120. Hague (IV) Regulations, supra note 8, art. 21.
121. AUST, supra note 115, at 6. For a further discussion of when a rule rises to the level of
customary international law, see id. at 6–8.
122. See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, With Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft
Articles].
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obligation and the circumstances surrounding the breach, determine
the consequences for the offending state.123 The Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and
accompanying commentary provide basic rules that outline when an
internationally wrongful act has been committed, any circumstances
precluding wrongfulness and, most relevant to this Article, the
requirement that an offending state make reparation appropriately.124
Under principles of international law, there are three distinct
components to reparation for an internationally wrongful act:
restitution, compensation, and satisfaction.125 Restitution provides
that a state must “re-establish the situation which existed before the
wrongful act was committed.”126 Where restitution does not provide
an adequate remedy, the state “is under an obligation to compensate
for the damage caused thereby . . . [which] shall cover any
financially assessable damage.”127 Financially assessable damage
refers to:
[N]ot only associated material losses, such as loss of
earnings and earning capacity, medical expenses and the
like, but also non-material damage suffered by the
individual . . . . Non-material damage is generally
understood to encompass loss of loved ones, pain and
suffering as well as the affront to sensibilities associated
with an intrusion on the person, home or private life.128
Finally, if a wrongful act “cannot be made good by restitution or
compensation,” the responsible state must give satisfaction: “an
acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. arts. 34–37.
126. Id. art. 35.
127. Id. art. 36.
128. Id. art. 36, commentary para. 16; see also The Lusitania Cases (Ger. v. U.S.), 7 R.I.A.A.
32 (1923). The tribunal explained:
That one injured is, under the rules of international law, entitled to be compensated for
an injury inflicted resulting in mental suffering, injury to his feelings, humiliation,
shame, degradation, loss of social position or injury to his credit or to his reputation,
there can be no doubt, and such compensation should be commensurate to the injury.
Such damages are very real, and the mere fact that they are difficult to measure or
estimate by money standards makes them none the less real and affords no reason why
the injured person should not be compensated therefore as compensatory damages, but
not as a penalty.
Id. at 40.
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apology, or another appropriate modality.”129 A wrongful act is
typically ameliorated by restitution or compensation, however, and
thus, the satisfaction component is less common.130
B. Universal Prohibitions and International
Obligations
In times of peace, various laws—both domestic and
international—inform the legality of state practices. In times of
armed conflict, however, the law of war provides a set of specialized
international rules that are better tailored to war. For example, under
U.S. domestic law, killing is generally unlawful. But in a time of
war, combatants possess the privilege “to attack and to resist the
enemy,”131 which permits tactics that can result in death. Killing is
not only permissible; it is inevitable. The same relationship exists
between international human rights law and the law of armed
conflict: international human rights law applies as a “default” rule.
During an armed conflict, however, the law of armed conflict
supersedes the general rule.132 Where individuals could not otherwise
kill soldiers, imprison individuals in preventive detention, or cause
large-scale destruction of property, the law of war permits such
conduct, as long as it conforms to certain principles.133
However, while the law of armed conflict permits certain
conduct that is otherwise unlawful under general domestic or
international human rights laws, some conduct is always unlawful.134
A peremptory norm of international law (also sometimes referred to
as jus cogens or a “jus cogens norm”) is “a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted” by any state.135 No
129. Draft Articles, supra note 122, art. 37.
130. Id. art. 37, commentary para. 1.
131. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 37 (2005).
132. See id. at 37–45.
133. See generally id. at 21–26 (2005) (describing the four basic principles of the law of
armed conflict: military necessity, humanity, distinction, and proportionality).
134. Erika de Wet, Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 541, 541–48 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013).
135. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331,
page number [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also de Wet, supra note 134, at 543 (“The fact
that complete consensus amongst states is not a requirement for the emergence of a peremptory
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justification can excuse a violation of a peremptory norm: “a
genocide cannot justify a counter genocide,” and “the plea of
necessity . . . cannot excuse the breach of a peremptory norm.”136 Put
differently, once prohibited conduct has reached the level of jus
cogens, it has the strongest force and can never be violated—not by
two countries agreeing in a treaty to violate the norm137 and not by a
state asserting a defense to excuse the violation.138
Very few acts have merited this heightened status, and there is
some disagreement as to which conduct amounts to a peremptory
norm.139 The widely accepted view includes “the prohibitions of
aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against
humanity and torture, and the right to self-determination.”140
In addition, there are separate obligations—obligations erga
omnes—that are owed to all states.141 Many scholars agree that all
jus cogens norms rise to the level of obligations erga omnes.142 But
the inverse is not true: there are obligations erga omnes that are not
jus cogens.143 A third category of obligations—obligations erga
omnes partes—describes the relationship among some groups of
states, especially in the context of certain multilateral treaties. That
is, where a treaty involves only a few states and “protect[s] a
collective interest of the group,” the treaty creates an obligation erga
omnes partes—an obligation owed only to members of that group.144
norm implies that the (very small number of) states not in agreement can nonetheless be bound
against their will.” (footnote omitted)).
136. Draft Articles, supra note 122, art. 26, commentary para. 4.
137. Vienna Convention, supra note 135, art. 53.
138. See Draft Articles, supra note 122, arts. 20–26.
139. See id. art. 26, commentary para. 5. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987) (purporting to expand the list of
peremptory norms of international law).
140. See Draft Articles, supra note 122, art. 26, commentary para. 5. The Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States furthers a more idealistic view, suggesting
“genocide; slavery or slave trade; the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals; torture
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; and
systematic racial discrimination” are peremptory norms of international law. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987). While U.S.
courts have acknowledged the Restatement’s position, for example, Princz v. Federal Republic of
Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1994), it is not the internationally accepted view.
141. AUST, supra note 115, at 10.
142. Id.; de Wet, supra note 134, at 553–55.
143. AUST, supra note 115, at 10; see also de Wet, supra note 134, at 553–55 (noting that
only certain erga omnes human rights obligations, e.g., the prohibition of genocide and torture,
are peremptory norms because they have been recognized as such by the majority of states).
144. Draft Articles, supra note 122, art. 48, commentary para. 5.
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Obligations erga omnes or erga omnes partes that do not rise to the
level of jus cogens may be violated under some circumstances,
including war.145
But a mere consensus that particular conduct is jus cogens, and
thus a non-derogable norm, accomplishes little in the way of
enforcement. As one scholar noted, “Practice has illustrated that the
recognition of the peremptory status of a particular norm is no
guarantee for effective enforcement of the norm and the values it
represents.”146 Indeed, while states can monitor and enforce
obligations through principles of state responsibility, states are not
required to pursue another’s breach, even when peremptory norms
are violated.
The breach of any obligation owed to a state, whether an
ordinary obligation or an obligation erga omnes, enables the injured
state to “invoke the responsibility” of the offending state.147
However, while a breach empowers the injured state to invoke
responsibility, the state is not obligated to do so. If an injured state
does invoke responsibility for a breach, it can “specify . . . the
conduct that the responsible State should take in order to cease the
wrongful act”148 and indicate “what form reparation should take.”149
Obligations erga omnes are unique. Because the breach of an
obligation erga omnes affects the international community as a
whole, such a breach enables both the injured and non-injured states
to invoke responsibility of the violating state.150 For a non-injured
state to invoke responsibility, either “the obligation breached is owed
to a group of states including [the invoking] state and is established
for the protection of a collective interest of the group” (constituting
an obligation erga omnes partes), or “the obligation breached is
owed to the international community as a whole” (constituting an
obligation erga omnes).151 Once a non-injured state has met these
145. See id. arts. 20–26.
146. de Wet, supra note 134, at 560.
147. Draft Articles, supra note 122, general commentary, para. 5 (“[The present articles]
apply to the whole field of the international obligations of states, whether the obligation is owed
to one or several States, to an individual or group, or to the international community as a
whole.”).
148. Id. art. 43.
149. Id.
150. See id. art. 48, commentary para. 5; infra Part V.A–B.
151. Draft Articles, supra note 122, art. 48, para. 1.
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threshold requirements, it can invoke basic principles of state
responsibility. Through state responsibility, the invoking state can
require: “(a) Cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition . . . and (b) Performance
of the obligation of reparation in accordance with [the Draft articles],
in the interest of the injured state or of the beneficiaries of the
obligation breached.”152 If an invoking state alleges a breach of an
obligation erga omnes, the violating state can raise any defense that
could “preclude [the] wrongfulness” of the breach.153 However, no
defense could preclude the wrongfulness of a state’s breach of a jus
cogens norm.
Domestic laws further complicate the force of international
treaty law, especially in the United States.154 In general, a state can
only be responsible for those obligations to which it has bound
itself.155 Furthermore, in the United States, many treaties are
designated not to be self-executing, meaning domestic legislation
must implement the United States’ obligations under international
law. The resulting patchwork of applicable laws, permissible
violations, and mechanisms for enforcement become particularly
important when it comes to treaties that include both jus cogens and
simple obligations.
C. The Convention Against Torture
Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1984, the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment generally prohibits torture, as well as cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment (CID) in any territory under the
jurisdiction of a state party to the treaty.156 However, due to the
language of the treaty and the nature of the conduct, the precise force
of each prohibition varies. Moreover, the United States’ reservations

152. Id. art. 48, para. 2.
153. Id. arts. 20–25.
154. See AUST, supra note 115, at 78–80.
155. See id. at 5–8. However, two exceptions exist under customary international law
whereby a nation will be responsible for obligations even if it has not bound itself: (1) a nation
fails to establish itself as a persistent objector and unwillingly becomes bound by a rule, or (2) a
nation develops after a rule of customary international law has developed. Interview with David
Glazier, Professor of Int’l Law, Loyola Law Sch., in L.A., Cal. (Jan. 7, 2014).
156. Convention Against Torture, supra note 54.
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have further limited the CAT’s applicability to the United States’
conduct.
1. Prohibitions Against Torture and CID Under the CAT
The CAT addresses torture, a peremptory norm of international
law, and CID—conduct that does not rise to the level of jus
cogens.157 As a result, the CAT provides one example in which the
distinction between jus cogens and other treaty obligations affects
the legality of conduct.158 In addition to prohibiting both torture and
CID, the CAT includes provisions regarding redress and
enforcement.159 For instance, Article 14 requires that each state party
“ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains
redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate
compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as
possible.”160 Articles 21 and 22 empower the Committee Against
Torture (“the Committee”) to receive communication of alleged
violations from states party to the treaty and from individuals
claiming to be victims of torture, respectively.161 Although the
Committee has the authority to investigate a state’s practices, this
oversight function means little in the way of actual enforcement; the
Committee can neither ensure compliance, nor award damages.162
The CAT defines torture as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third party
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See infra Part III.D.3.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 54.
Id. art. 14.
Id.
Id. arts. 21–22.
Id.
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public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.163
The CAT limits the definition of torture to exclude “pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.”164
The CAT does not define CID, beyond indicating that it is treatment
that does not rise to the level of torture.165
Differentiating between torture and CID is critical, as the two
types of conduct have very different legal consequences. Committing
torture violates a peremptory norm of international law (and thus an
obligation erga omnes), which triggers a variety of enforcement
mechanisms to address the violation.166 On the other hand, CID
breaches the CAT, but CID is not a peremptory norm of international
law.167 As a result, only an “injured” state can hold the wrongful
state accountable for CID. Yet, some international authorities,
including the International Court of Justice (ICJ), have indicated that
the CAT creates an obligation erga omnes partes.168 In one case, the
ICJ found that the commission of CID would “injure” every state
party to the treaty.169 At the same time, the CAT’s text does not
provide a right for states party to the treaty to assert another’s breach.
In either circumstance, because CID has not attained the status of
a jus cogens norm, the alleged violating party could justify its
actions using permitted legal defenses (for instance, necessity or
self-defense), as well as factual defenses (primarily, that the
treatment did not rise to the level of cruel, inhuman, and
degrading).170

163. Id. art.1, para. 1.
164. Id.
165. Id. art. 16, para. 1.
166. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
167. See infra Part III.D.3.
168. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment,
2012 I.C.J. 422, 450 para. 69 (July 20). While only persuasive authority, the ICJ recently
concluded that the CAT created an enforceable obligation on behalf of all states party to the
treaty. In other words, the CAT creates obligations erga omnes partes, in addition to addressing
torture, which, even without the treaty provisions, would be an obligation erga omnes. See also
Draft Articles, supra note 122, art. 48, commentary para. 6 (explaining obligations erga omnes
partes).
169. See Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, supra note 168, at
449 para. 68.
170. See Draft Articles, supra note 122, at 71–86.

Spring 2015]

REPATRIATE . . . THEN COMPENSATE

895

2. Understanding the United States’ Obligations
Under the CAT
Ten years after the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CAT,
the United States ratified it and included reservations limiting the
effect of various provisions regarding both torture and CID.171
In its reservations and interpretive understandings, the United
States clarified the definition of torture and, in turn, its obligations
under the treaty. For the United States,
in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to
prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from (1) the
intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or
application, or threatened administration or application, of
mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to
disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the
threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another
person will imminently be subjected to death, severe
physical pain or suffering, or the administration or
application of mind altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.172
One understanding, added at ratification, qualified “torture” to
“apply only to acts directed against persons in the offender’s custody
or physical control.”173 Another provided, “[I]t is the understanding
of the United States that Article 14 requires a State Party to provide a
private right of action for damages only for acts of torture committed

171. Convention Against Torture, supra note 54, art. 1, para. 1. The U.S. Senate ratified the
Convention, subject to several reservations, on October 27, 1990. 136 Cong. Rec. 36192, 36198–
99 (Oct. 29, 1990) [hereinafter CAT Reservations]. The text of these reservations is also available
at the online U.N. Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg
_no=IV-9&chapter=4. The United States included these as “understandings,” but such provisions
altered the extent of the United States’ obligations under the treaty, essentially creating additional
reservations. See AUST, supra note 115, at 65 (“[I]t does not matter how a declaration is phrased
or what name is given to it—one must look at the substance . . . The statement went beyond mere
interpretation and amounted to a reservation.”).
172. CAT Reservations, supra note 171, Reservation II(1)(a).
173. Id. Reservation II(1)(b).
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in territory under the jurisdiction of that State Party.”174 And, the
U.S. reservation qualified the definition of CID to include only
“cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by
the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States.”175
In its accompanying declaration, the United States deemed
Articles 1 through 16 of the CAT not to be self-executing, thereby
requiring additional domestic legislation to implement the
provisions.176 While the United States has maintained that its
“criminal justice system contains a number of specific procedural
mechanisms which, taken together, offer strong additional
protections against the occurrence of torture and remedial
opportunities in the event that it nonetheless occurs,”177 it has also
implemented laws specifically to fulfill its obligations under the
CAT, such as the statute criminalizing acts of torture (§ 2340A) and
the TVPA.178
174. Id. Reservation III(3) (emphasis added). This provision seems to provide hope for
detainees who seek damages, alleging that they were tortured. However, because the United
States has declared that Articles 1 through 16 are not self-executing, the United States can argue
that it need comply only with the requirements under the domestic law, the Torture Victims
Protection Act (TVPA). The TVPA, however, is limited to conduct carried out by a foreign
nation. See infra Part IV.C; see also infra Part III.C.3 (discussing whether Guantánamo is
considered “territory under [U.S.] jurisdiction”).
175. CAT Reservations, supra note 171, Reservation I(1).
176. Id. Reservation III(1).
177. United States, Initial Report to the Committee Against Torture, para. 120,
CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Feb. 9, 2000); see also United States, Second Periodic Report to the
Committee Against Torture, CAT/C/48/Add.3 [hereinafter Second Report] (May 6, 2005). “As
described in the Initial Report, the legal system of the United States provides a variety of
mechanisms through which persons subjected to torture or other abuse may seek redress, which
are consistent with the obligations assumed by the United States upon ratification of the [CAT].”
Id. para. 79.
178. For a greater discussion of the TVPA, see infra Part IV.C. For a greater discussion of
18 U.S.C. § 2340A, see supra Part I.B. There is a valid question as to whether the United States’
domestic laws comply with the nation’s international obligations under the CAT. For example, in
the Bybee Standards Memorandum, supra note 46, DOJ wrote that, should the President or other
officials face charges under 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, the domestic statute prohibiting and
criminalizing torture, the accused could raise the defenses of necessity and self-defense. DOJ
pointed out this discrepancy in a footnote, explaining that the CAT’s prohibition on torture,
including for “such purpose as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession”
might “represent[] an attempt to to [sic] indicate that the good of obtaining information—no
matter what the circumstances—could not justify an act of torture.” Bybee Standards
Memorandum, supra note 46, at 41 n.23 (internal citations omitted) (citing Convention Against
Torture, supra note 54, art. 1.1). The memorandum continued, “In enacting Section 2340,
however, Congress removed the purpose element in the definition of torture . . . By leaving
Section 2340 silent as to the harm done by torture in comparison to other harms, Congress
allowed the necessity defense to apply when appropriate.” Id. Moreover, while the CAT provides
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Articles 21 and 22 of the CAT permit states party to the treaty
and individuals claiming to be victims of torture to file complaints
with the Committee Against Torture, alleging that a state is not
honoring its obligations under the Convention. The United States,
however, recognizes the competence of the Committee to “receive
and consider communications” only from a state party.179 The United
States narrowed its recognition of the Committee’s power even
further, declaring that “such communications shall be accepted and
processed only if they come from a state party which [also
recognizes the Committee’s competence].”180 In its justification for
declining to “recognize the competence of the Committee to consider
communications made by or on behalf of individuals claiming to be
victims of a violation of the Convention by the United States,”181 the
United States has consistently referred to the existing “numerous
opportunities for individuals to complain of abuse, and to seek
remedies for such alleged violations” under the domestic legal
system.182 These “opportunities,” however, do not extend to the
detainees at Guantánamo.
D. Questions Unanswered: Why U.S. Conduct at
Guantánamo May Fall Outside the CAT’s Purview
The United States’ reservations, understandings, and
declarations raise many questions as to whether a detainee could
successfully claim that the United States has breached its
international obligations. Specifically, whether the United States has
violated the CAT depends on Guantánamo’s location, the ways in
which the United States analyzes the prohibition on CID, and
whether the prohibition of CID is non-derogable.

that there may be no derogation whatsoever from the prohibition of torture, see Convention
Against Torture, supra note 54, art. 2.2, DOJ concluded, “Aware of this provision of the
treaty . . . Congress did not incorporate CAT article 2.2 into Section 2340. Given that Congress
omitted CAT’s effort to bar a necessity or wartime defense, we read Section 2340 as permitting
the defense.” Bybee Standards Memorandum, supra note 46, at 41 n.23 (emphasis added).
179. Convention Against Torture supra note 54, art. 21, para. 1.
180. CAT Reservations, supra note 171, at III.(2).
181. Second Report, supra note 177, para. 163.
182. Id.
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1. Where Is Guantánamo Bay?
Guantánamo Bay’s location outside of the United States could
render the CAT entirely inapplicable to the conduct carried out there.
By its terms, the CAT directs states party to the treaty to prohibit acts
of torture and CID “in any territory under its jurisdiction.”183 While
this jurisdictional element ultimately would not affect the general
prohibition of torture—due to its status as a jus cogens norm—
conduct that did amount to CID but occurred outside of the territory
under a state’s jurisdiction would be immune from scrutiny under the
CAT.184 Guantánamo Bay’s legal status—whether it is “territory
under the United States’ jurisdiction”—remains unclear.185 The U.S.
Supreme Court touched on this issue in 2004; in Rasul, the Court, in
concluding that the detainees had a right to habeas corpus, explained,
“By the express terms of its agreements with Cuba, the United States
exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’ over the Guantánamo
Bay Naval Base, and may continue to exercise such control
permanently if it so chooses.”186
In 2008, the Court revisited the discussion of the territorial
jurisdiction of Guantánamo in another habeas case, Boumediene.187
The majority wrote:
[F]or the purposes of our analysis, we accept the
Government’s position that Cuba, and not the United States,
retains de jure sovereignty over Guantánamo Bay [but] take
notice of the obvious and uncontested fact that the United
States, by virtue of its complete jurisdiction and control
over the base maintains de facto sovereignty over this
territory.188
The majority opinion did not fully resolve territorial jurisdiction, but
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion may have provided some clarity.
Justice Scalia charged the Court with “conced[ing] (necessarily) that
Guantánamo Bay lies outside the sovereign territory of the United

183. Convention Against Torture, supra note 54, art. 2, para. 1; id. art. 16.
184. This assertion necessarily presumes that CID is not a non-derogable norm. See infra Part
III.D.3.
185. Philbin-Yoo Memorandum, supra note 37 (discussing possible habeas jurisdiction over
aliens at Guantánamo).
186. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004).
187. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
188. Id. at 755 (emphasis added).
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States,”189 while also creating a “novel”190 distinction between de
jure and de facto sovereignty. He wrote, “The Court comes up with
the notion that ‘de jure sovereignty’ is simply an additional factor
that can be added to (presumably) ‘de facto sovereignty’ (i.e.
practical control) to determine the availability of habeas for aliens,
but that it is not a necessary factor, whereas de facto sovereignty
is.”191 If the United States does exercise de facto sovereignty over
Guantánamo Bay, then it may be considered territory under the
United States’ jurisdiction for the purposes of the CAT. But Rasul
and Boumediene both considered whether Guantánamo detainees
could “invoke the fundamental procedural protections of habeas
corpus . . . a right of first importance.”192 Because of the unique
nature of a habeas corpus petition, the jurisdictional question that
Rasul and Boumediene answer may differ from the one implicated by
the CAT.
2. What Does the CID Reservation Mean?
Even if Guantánamo Bay is territory under the United States’
jurisdiction, a second obstacle to a detainee’s prospect of relief is
whether the United States’ reservation, limiting CID to “cruel,
unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the
Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States” exempts the United States’ conduct at
Guantánamo from the purview of the CAT altogether. Due to careful
drafting before the implementation of “enhanced interrogation
techniques,” it may be difficult for a detainee to assert that the
United States breached its obligations under the CAT as well as its
reservation to the CAT by engaging in conduct that constituted
“cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment” under the U.S.
reservations.193
189. Id. at 832 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 835 n.3.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 798 (majority opinion).
193. The discussion of the United States’ reservation proceeds considering only the conduct
that is permissible or unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The uncertainty surrounding
the precise meaning of the reservation raises many questions. For example, if the Constitution
cannot be applied to aliens beyond the territory of the United States, does the language of the
reservation serve to limit the United States’ obligation to prevent CID exclusively in U.S.
territory? See Bradbury Memorandum, supra note 68 (relying on the same decisions that the U.S.

900

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:867

Moreover, courts apply the facts of each Eighth Amendment
challenge to a general standard. For instance, in Hope v. Pelzer,194
Hope was a prison inmate who was “handcuffed to a hitching post”
for over two hours with his hands above shoulder height.195 On
another occasion, Hope was handcuffed to the post for seven
hours.196 The Court ultimately found that this treatment violated the
Eighth Amendment, as it involved “the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain . . . totally without penological justification.”197
The Court explained, “In making this determination in the
context of prison conditions, we must ascertain whether the officials
acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to the inmates’ health or
safety.”198 In light of the general Eighth Amendment legal standard,
a court may be largely deferential to the military’s claims that the
treatment was necessary to obtain crucial national security
information. It is therefore difficult to determine with certainty the
precise conduct that is prohibited under Article 16 of the CAT.
3. When, If Ever, Can a Country Derogate from
the Prohibition of CID?
However, even if the United States engaged in conduct
prohibited by its reservation in a territory under its jurisdiction, the
CAT’s silence as to whether CID is a non-derogable norm suggests
that states can derogate from the prohibition against CID under
certain circumstances. Basic principles of statutory interpretation
suggest that the treaty’s drafters would have been unambiguous had
Supreme Court discounted in Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723, including Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763 (1950), and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)). But see Beaver
Strategies Memorandum, supra note 47, at 7 (“[T]he United States is only prohibited from
committing those acts that would otherwise be prohibited under the United States Constitutional
Amendment against cruel and unusual punishment.” (emphasis added)). If the Eighth
Amendment only applies after the state has first “secured a formal adjudication of guilt,” Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979), and until adjudication the Due Process Clause is the
applicable constitutional provision, to what extent are wartime detainees afforded a level of
Constitutional process? Do the CSRTs comply? A full discussion of these issues, however, is
outside the scope of this Article. For a further discussion of the CAT and the Eighth Amendment,
see MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32438, U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE (CAT): OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES 7–8 (2008),
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/101750.pdf.
194. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
195. Id. at 734.
196. Id. at 735.
197. Id. at 737.
198. Id. at 737–38 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)).
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they intended liability.199 Article 2 of the CAT expressly states that
torture is a non-derogable norm, and that “no exceptional
circumstances whatsoever . . . may be invoked as a justification of
torture.”200 But no similar provision exists for CID.201 Moreover,
Article 16, the relevant provision that names CID, also references
obligations contained in four other articles, stating that they “shall
apply with the substitution for references to torture of references to
other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment.”202 Article 2 is not included among those four.203
Furthermore, a separate United Nations Treaty, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),204 was adopted in
1966 and signed by the United States in 1977,205 seven years before
the CAT was adopted.206 The ICCPR provides in relevant part, “No
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”207 However, unlike the CAT, the ICCPR
has a specific derogation provision.208
Yet the subsequent paragraph bars states from derogating from
certain articles, including Article 7, the prohibition against CID.209
Thus, not only did the drafters of the CAT prohibit derogation
199. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
176–77 (1994) (“If . . . Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, we presume it
would have used the words ‘aid’ and ‘abet’ in the statutory text. But it did not.”).
200. Convention Against Torture, supra note 54, art. 2, para. 2.
201. See id. art. 16.
202. Id. art. 16, para. 1.
203. Id.
204. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
205. The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992, and included a reservation identical to its
reservation to the CAT regarding the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 138 CONG.
REC. S4,781, S4,783–84 (daily ed. April 2, 1992) (resolution of ratification); cf. CAT
Reservations, supra note 171.
206. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 54 (adopted in 1984, ratified by the United
States in 1994).
207. ICCPR, supra note 204, art. 7.
208. Id. art. 4, para. 1. The specific derogation provision explains,
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of
which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law.
Id.
209. Id. art. 4, para. 2. Whether the United States has violated its international obligations
under the ICCPR is outside the scope of this Article.
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elsewhere in that very treaty, but a United Nations treaty that
pre-dated the CAT included a non-derogation provision specifically
concerning CID as well. Consequently, it seems as though CID under
the CAT is not a non-derogable norm.
IV. A DETAINEE’S INABILITY TO INDIVIDUALLY SEEK REDRESS IN
ARTICLE III COURTS
The principle of reparation has long existed in the United States.
But for most detainees, the non-state nature of the WAQT creates
new procedural challenges. While it would seem as though the
Guantánamo detainees have multiple avenues to seek redress, in fact,
they do not. Detainees have attempted to seek monetary damages
individually in U.S. domestic courts, but such attempts have been
futile—usually dismissed due to sovereign immunity or lack of
jurisdiction. Ultimately, the only existing option is for states to come
forward and invoke principles of state responsibility on behalf of the
detainees.210 Though limited, this is the sole option, short of defying
existing precedent in federal courts.
A. The Right to Reparation in the Twentieth Century
As a general principle of law, when one party wrongs another,
the offending party must pay damages. This principle also applies in
international law—through international treaties, principles of state
responsibility, and the law of armed conflict—requiring a state in
violation of the law to pay compensation or make reparation
accordingly.211 Under customary international law and principles of
state responsibility, a state responsible for an internationally
wrongful act has an obligation to make reparation.212 And this
principle is reflected in the law of armed conflict: the Hague
Convention (IV) of 1907 sets forth a series of rules governing land
warfare, and states that if a belligerent party violates these rules, it
“shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation.”213
Moreover, the Convention states that a belligerent party “shall be
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its
210. See infra Part V.
211. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 54, art. 14; Hague (IV) Convention, supra
note 8, art. 3; Draft Articles, supra note 122, arts. 35–39.
212. Draft Articles, supra note 122, art. 31.
213. Hague (IV) Convention, supra note 8, art. 3.
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armed forces.”214 These principles of reparation and compensation
have been invoked throughout the twentieth century by the ICJ,215
the United Nations,216 and in post-war reparations agreements
between countries.217
When its own citizens are affected, the United States has clearly
recognized the need for reparation or compensation, as it has actively
proposed or facilitated negotiations on behalf of its nationals. For
instance, in a particularly noteworthy case, a U.S. citizen
attempted—unsuccessfully—to sue Germany for imprisonment in
concentration camps and forced labor during World War II. His
action prompted U.S. President Bill Clinton to “personally raise[]
[the] case with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl,” ultimately
securing a $2.1 million settlement for the citizen and eleven other
concentration camp survivors.218 The United States and Germany
reached a second settlement for two hundred additional Americans in
1999.219 And the United States has condemned Japan, repeatedly
calling for reparations to Americans as a result of Japan’s treatment
of prisoners of war and comfort women during World War II.220
More recently, two bills were introduced in Congress in spring
2013 proposing compensation to the survivors of the 1979–81
Iranian Hostage Crisis.221 The Algiers Accord, which secured the
hostages’ release in 1981, precluded any claims against Iran arising
214. Id. In the context of Guantánamo, this language raises an interesting question of
responsibility with respect to private agencies that do not constitute the “armed forces.” However,
the obligations and liability of these individuals are outside the scope of this Article.
215. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 5 (Dec. 19), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files
/116/10455.pdf; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
216. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 8, 1991); S.C. Res. 138, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/138 (Jun. 23, 1960).
217. See, e.g., Treaty of Versailles, arts. 231–47, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43; Conference of
Berlin, Protocol, §§ III, VII, Jul. 17–Aug. 2, 1945, 3 Bevans 1207; Paris Peace Treaties, arts. 74–
77, Feb. 10, 1947, 49 U.N.T.S. 154.
218. Douglas Martin, Hugo Princz, 78, U.S. Winner of Holocaust Settlement, Dies, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 31, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/31/nyregion/hugo-princz-78-us-winner
-of-holocaust-settlement-dies.html.
219. Id.
220. H.R. Con. Res. 357, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. Con. Res. 176, 104th Cong. (1996).
221. Justice for Former American Hostages in Iran Act of 2013, S. 559, 113th Cong. (2013);
Justice for the American Diplomats Held Hostage in Tehran Act, H.R. 904, 113th Cong. (2013);
JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43210, THE IRAN HOSTAGES: EFFORTS TO
OBTAIN COMPENSATION (2013), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43210.pdf.
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out of the incident.222 Although the U.S. government already
provided the survivors with “a cash payment of $50 for each day
held hostage,” the 2013 bills proposed the establishment of a U.S.
fund to pay the hostage victims or their families, with one bill citing
the “profound physical and mental abuse” that the hostages
endured.223 Indeed, many of the former hostages reported
experiencing “depression . . . nightmares, flashbacks, divorces, and
physical illnesses,” as a result of their captivity over thirty years
ago.224 The Hostage Crisis bills indicate that the United States
recognizes the need to compensate individuals who were wrongfully
imprisoned, mistreated, and as a result of their detention, suffered
long-term psychological trauma.
B. Why the Law of War Does Not Confer a Right of Action
Multiple sources of international law support the notion of
reparation or compensation when there is a violation of the law.
However, most of these provisions are not understood as conferring a
private right of action and thus are unavailing to Guantánamo
detainees. Under the law of war, Article 3 of the Hague Convention
provides, “A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the
said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by
persons forming part of its armed forces.”225 A violation of the
Hague Convention would seemingly require the United States to
provide compensation to detainees. However, Hague Law governs
permissible conduct during an armed conflict—the means of injuring
a belligerent army, military occupation, and treatment of prisoners of
war.226 Detention at Guantánamo does not fall squarely within any of
those categories. While it may be easy to find instances in which the
United States has violated the CAT or perhaps even provisions of the

222. ELSEA, supra note 221, at 1.
223. H.R. 904 § 2.
224. Jill Lawrence, “Argo” Is Great, but 52 Former American Hostages Are Still Looking for
Justice, NAT’L J., Feb. 24, 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/argo-is-great-but-52
-former-american-hostages-are-still-looking-for-justice-20130224.
225. Hague (IV) Convention, supra note 8, art. 3. While Article 2 states that the Convention’s
provisions only apply as between contracting powers to the convention, if the Convention’s
provisions have become customary international law, then they apply universally (except to
persistent objectors).
226. Hague (IV) Convention, supra note 8.
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Geneva Conventions,227 it is unlikely that Hague Law applies to the
detention and even less likely that there has been a violation of
Hague Law at Guantánamo.
But even if there has been a violation of Hague Law at
Guantánamo, in practice, domestic courts in both the United States
and other countries are reluctant to find that the Hague Convention
provides a private right of action for reparations claims. For example,
in Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States,228 a group of businesses
sued the United States under Article 3 of the Hague Convention,
seeking compensation and “claim[ing] that the United States
Government [was] liable for damage to the property of [the]
businesses that occurred as a result of looting and rioting in the wake
of the United States’ invasion of Panama.”229 The plaintiffs alleged
that the United States had violated Article 43 of the Regulations
when its armed forces failed to adequately “ensure . . . public order
and safety” upon their invasion and occupation of Panama in
1989.230 The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.231
The circuit court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, rejecting
the plaintiffs’ argument that “Article 3 must be interpreted as a

227. In addition to the basic rules of conduct outlined in Common Article 3, Article 5 of
Geneva III provides,
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons having committed a belligerent act and
having fallen into the hands of the enemy belong to [the armed forces or another
protected class eligible for treatment as a prisoner of war], such persons shall enjoy the
protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined
by a competent tribunal.
Geneva III, supra note 29, art. 5. Though detention facilities at Guantánamo opened in 2002, the
first Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) to determine whether detainees were properly
categorized as “enemy combatants” was not conducted until July 30, 2004. Combatant Status
Review Tribunal Summary, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.defense.gov/news
/csrtsummary.pdf.
228. 967 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1992).
229. Id. at 967.
230. Id. at 967–68. The relevant regulation states,
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as
far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented,
the laws in force in the country.
Hague (IV) Regulations, supra note 8, art. 43.
231. Goldstar, 967 F.2d at 967.
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self-executing waiver of sovereign immunity with regard to [claims
for violations of the Hague Convention].”232 Instead, the court stated:
International treaties are not presumed to create rights that
are privately enforceable. Courts will only find a treaty to
be self-executing if the document, as a whole, evidences an
intent to provide a private right of action. The Hague
Convention does not explicitly provide for a privately
enforceable cause of action.233
To bolster its conclusion, the court relied on a Supreme Court case in
which a party attempted to invoke a treaty’s compensation
provision.234 In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that the
conventions “only set forth substantive rules of conduct” and “do not
create private rights of action.”235 In cases outside of the United
States, nationals of other countries encounter similar barriers to
asserting a private right of action for compensation under the Hague
Convention; the courts occasionally find a private right to exist,
based on both the international law and the state’s domestic laws.236
Nevertheless, the predominant practice does not support a private
right of action for individuals, as the source of the law is that
between states.237
232. Id. at 968. For a greater discussion of sovereign immunity with respect to suits against
the U.S. government, see infra Part IV.C.
233. Goldstar, 967 F.2d at 968 (citations omitted).
234. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
235. Id. at 442.
236. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, in a 1996 case regarding reparations for
forced labor during the Second World War, noted in dicta that international law did not prohibit a
state from permitting individuals to claim compensation through national courts. 2 INT’L COMM.
OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3561 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (citing Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG]
[Federal
Constitutional
Court]
May 13,
1996,
94
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 315 (Ger.)). Similarly, the Greek Supreme Court
held in 2000 that because it had violated jus cogens norms Germany could not invoke sovereign
immunity. Id. at 3561–62 (citing Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Areios
Pagos [A.P.] [Supreme Court] 11/2000).
237. See id. at 3561, para. 193 (citing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice]
Jun. 26, 2003, 155 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ]
279 (Ger.) (the Distomo case)) (“Germany’s Federal Supreme Court stated that, due to a concept
of war as a ‘relationship from State to State’ as it existed during the Second World War, a State
which was responsible for crimes committed at that time was only liable to pay compensation visà-vis another State but not vis-à-vis the individual victims.”); id. at 3562–63, para. 195 (citing
Tōkyō Chilhō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] Dec. 7, 1963, 355 HANREI JIHO [HANJI] 17 (Japan)
(the Shimoda case)) (“[T]he Court concluded that ‘there is in general no way open to an
individual who suffers injuries from an act of hostilities contrary to international law to claim
damages on the level of international law’ except in limited circumstances.”); id. at 3563, para.
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Yet some scholars, citing U.S. practices, suggest that there has
been a shifting trend toward finding a private right of action for
individual victims.238 For instance, in 2000, the U.S. Congress passed
a Concurrent Resolution calling upon the Japanese government to
rectify its World War II violations of the Geneva and Hague
Conventions. The resolution asserted that the Japanese government
“should . . . immediately pay reparations to the victims of those [war]
crimes, including United States military and civilian prisoners of
war . . . and the women who were forced into sexual slavery and
known by the Japanese military as ‘comfort women.’”239 Unlike
other reparations payments stemming from World War II, this
resolution suggested that the victims had a direct right to receive
compensation from the offending government. Perhaps the right to
receive compensation will eventually become a right that can be
asserted in court; until then, however, there are many obstacles for
plaintiffs attempting to bring a claim for compensation in a domestic
court.
C. Adding Insult to Injury: Why Detainees Are Unable to
Bring a Claim Under U.S. Law
To date, litigation seeking compensation on behalf of
Guantánamo detainees has relied on the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), but such actions
consistently fail.240 Most often, the cases are dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction in light of the jurisdiction-stripping
provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(e)).241 In other instances, courts will dismiss the case due to

197 (quoting Tōkyō Chilhō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] July 27, 1995 (Japan) (the Apology for
the Kamishisuka Slaughter of Koreans case)) (“[N]either the general practice nor the conviction
(opinio juris) that the state has a duty to pay damages to each individual when that state infringes
its obligations under . . . international humanitarian law can be said to exist.”).
238. 1 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 541 (citing Draft Articles, supra note 122, art. 33 and commentary).
239. H.R. Con. Res. 357, 106th Cong. (2000).
240. Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2013); Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315
(D.C. Cir. 2012); Ameur v. Gates, 950 F. Supp. 2d 905 (E.D. Va. 2013), aff’d, 759 F.3d 317 (4th
Cir. 2014); Al Janko v. Gates, 831 F. Supp. 2d 272 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 741 F.3d 136 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
241. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (2006); Hamad, 732 F.3d 990; Al-Zahrani, 669 F.3d 315; Ameur,
950 F. Supp. 2d 905.
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sovereign immunity.242 One author explained that “where U.S.
employees or officials are accused of being the alleged torturers, the
United States launches procedural and substantive roadblocks to
ensure that the claims do not succeed or even progress much beyond
the filing stage.”243
1. Claims Under the Alien Tort Statute and
Federal Tort Claims Act
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court held that the Guantánamo
detainees had a “constitutional privilege of habeas corpus,”244
striking down one segment of the jurisdiction-stripping provision of
the Military Commissions Act.245 The remaining provision reads:
Except [to review a CSRT determination, or to review the
decision of a military commission], no court, justice, or
judge shall have jurisdiction to hear . . . any other action
against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect
of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of
confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the
United States and has been determined by the United States
to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is
awaiting such determination.246
At least one plaintiff seeking monetary damages has argued that he
was not “properly detained as an enemy combatant,” pointing to his
successful habeas petition as evidence, but the district court was not
persuaded.247 Without questioning the validity of the CSRTs, the
district court found that “the determinations of two separate
CSRTs—one in 2004, and another in 2008, both of which
determined that plaintiff was an enemy combatant—more than

242. Ameur, 950 F. Supp. 2d 905; see also Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Ali was a case concerning detention in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the court provided the same
reasoning as Guantánamo detention cases with respect to the ATS and FTCA claims. 649 F.3d
762.
243. Peter Jan Honigsberg, In Search of a Forum for the Families of the Guantánamo
Disappeared, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 433, 455 (2012).
244. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 724 (2008).
245. Id. at 733.
246. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2). At Guantánamo, the determination of whether an individual was
“properly detained as an enemy combatant” occurred through the CSRTs. See supra Section I.D.
247. Al Janko v. Gates, 831 F. Supp. 2d 272 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 741 F.3d 136 (D.C. Cir.
2014). For the unclassified portion of the court’s analysis in the habeas petition, see Al Ginco v.
Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2009).
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satisf[ied] the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2).”248
Effectively, all detainees—those who are truly “the worst of the
worst” and those who were merely swept up in the fog of war and are
later released—will have the same fate: once a CSRT has “properly”
categorized him as an enemy combatant, anyone who finds himself
at Guantánamo will be barred from seeking any remedy other than a
habeas petition for any aspect of his detention.
In light of Boumediene, plaintiffs assert that the remaining
jurisdiction-stripping provision § 2241(e)(2) cannot be severed from
the first, and that the statute must be struck down in its entirety.249
Courts disagree.250 Nevertheless, despite the courts’ conclusions that
they do not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear these claims,
courts often continue their analysis and come to the same result
under the ATS and FTCA, extinguishing another possibility of
monetary relief.251
Although the purpose of the ATS and FTCA is to provide tort
victims with an avenue for relief, this path is ultimately unavailing to
detainees. The ATS grants “district courts . . . original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”252 While the ATS
confers jurisdiction, it does not create a cause of action itself.253
248. Al Janko, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 279.
249. Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2013); Al Janko, 831 F. Supp. 2d 272.
250. Hamad, 732 F.3d at 1006; Al Janko, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 284.
251. See, e.g., Ameur v. Gates, 950 F. Supp. 2d 905, 913–14 (E.D. Va. 2013), aff’d, 759 F.3d
317 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding that there was no subject matter jurisdiction because of sovereign
immunity); Al Janko, 831 F. Supp. 2d 272.
252. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). The Supreme Court drastically narrowed the scope of the ATS
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), addressing “whether a[n ATS]
claim may reach conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign.” Id. at 1664. The
majority held that the facts of the case could not overcome the presumption against extraterritorial
application of the ATS because of the “serious foreign policy consequences,” including providing
other nations the opportunity to “hale [U.S.] citizens into their courts for alleged violations of the
law of nations occurring in the United States, or anywhere else in the world.” Id. at 1669. Yet,
Kiobel can be easily distinguished from Guantánamo litigation. While the conduct at issue is
occurring in a sovereign nation (Cuba), aliens are attempting to bring claims against the United
States in U.S. courts, thereby eliminating the same foreign policy concern. Even so, while the
ATS may not bar the claim, the foreign country exception to the FTCA (discussed below)
provides yet another obstacle.
253. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). The Court explained, “In sum, although
the [Alien Tort Statute] is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action, the reasonable
inference from the historical materials is that the statute was intended to have practical effect the
moment it became law.” Id. at 724. However, searching for the First Congress’s intent in passing
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Consequently, a claim under the statute is often paired with—or as
the courts put it, “restyled as”254—a claim under the FTCA in
Guantánamo detainee litigation. The FTCA allows individuals who
have been injured by the “negligent or wrongful act or omission” of
any federal employee “acting within the scope of his office or
employment” to bring a claim against the United States, in situations
where “the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.”255 Though the federal government generally
enjoys immunity from lawsuits, it can consent to be sued by
expressly waiving its immunity.256 The FTCA serves as such a
waiver.257
In 1988, Congress passed the Westfall Act,258 which amended
the FTCA “to require that the United States be substituted as the
defendant in any tort suit brought against a government employee
acting within the scope of her employment.”259 The D.C. Circuit has
broadly interpreted “the scope of employment,” rejecting the notion
that violations of jus cogens norms are outside of the scope of
employment.260 In fact, the D.C. Circuit held that “allegations of
serious criminality do not alter [the] conclusion that the defendants’
conduct was incidental to authorized conduct.”261 Under this
standard then, all of the “enhanced interrogation tactics” might be
the Alien Tort Statute in 1789, the Court did believe “the First Congress understood that the
district courts would recognize private causes of action for certain torts in violation of the law of
nations.” Id. The Court suggested that federal courts could recognize such claims, but highlighted
the need for judicial discretion: “[W]e think courts should require any claim based on the
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we
have recognized.” Id. Yet, even with this invitation from the Supreme Court, lower courts are
reluctant to find that the ATS confers a cause of action at all in detainee litigation. See, e.g., Ali v.
Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Edwards, J., dissenting).
254. Ali, 649 F.3d at 774.
255. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
256. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
257. Ameur v. Gates, 950 F. Supp. 2d 905 (E.D. Va. 2013), aff’d, 759 F.3d 317 (4th Cir.
2014).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1948).
259. Case Comment, Federal Statutes—Westfall Act—D.C. Circuit Holds That U.S. Officials
Are Immune from Alien Tort Statute Claims: Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 125
HARV. L. REV. 1080, 1080 (2012). There are two exceptions to substitution: when the employer’s
actions violate the Constitution, or when a statute specifically authorizes a lawsuit against the
employee. Ameur, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 917–18.
260. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 774–75 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
261. Id. at 775.
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within the scope of employment, even though the conduct violates
international law. Indeed, in the various detention cases—whether at
Guantánamo or other overseas sites—courts maintain that
substituting the United States as a defendant is proper.262
But new obstacles emerge. In the ordinary FTCA case, once
the United States has been substituted as a defendant, the FTCA
prevents it from raising a sovereign-immunity defense. For
Guantánamo-detainee litigation, however, the FTCA’s “foreign
country exception”263 enables the United States’ sovereign immunity
to remain intact. That exception “bars all claims based on any injury
suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or
omission occurred.”264 To that end, courts have held the waiver of
sovereign immunity does not apply to alleged violations of
customary international law and the law of war, because claims that
are “not cognizable under state tort law . . . [do] not fall within the
sovereign’s waiver of immunity and must be dismissed.”265
2. Claims Under the Torture Victim Protection Act
FTCA claims are inaccessible to detainees, and so too are TVPA
claims. Signed into law in 1992, the TVPA was intended to benefit
victims of “acts of torture and extrajudicial killing committed
overseas by foreign individuals.”266 For Guantánamo detainees, the
relevant clause of the TVPA provides, “An individual who, under
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign
nation . . . subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to that individual.”267
For the Guantánamo detainees, the TVPA is not a viable option
for redress for two reasons. First, by its terms, the statute is limited to
262. See, e.g., id.; Ameur, 950 F. Supp. 2d 905; Al Janko v. Gates, 831 F. Supp. 2d 272
(D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 741 F.3d 136 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.
2013).
263. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2012).
264. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). The foreign country exception
plainly precludes “any claim arising in a foreign country” from the FTCA waiver. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(k).
265. Al Janko, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 283 n.20 (citing Sobitan v. Glud, 589 F.3d 379, 389 (7th
Cir. 2009)).
266. Statement on Signing the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 1 PUB. PAPERS 437
(Mar. 12, 1992) [hereinafter TVPA Signing Statement].
267. Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) [hereinafter
TVPA] (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
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conduct carried out by authority of a foreign nation. It is thus
inapplicable to U.S. conduct at Guantánamo, or anywhere else in the
world.268 In fact, President George H. W. Bush reiterated this point
when he signed the TVPA into law:
I am signing the bill based on my understanding that the
Act does not permit suits for alleged human rights
violations in the context of United States military operations
abroad or law enforcement actions. Because the Act permits
suits based only on actions “under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation,” I do not
believe it is the Congress’ intent that H.R. 2092 should
apply to the United States Armed Forces or law
enforcement operations, which are always carried out under
the authority of United States Law.269
Second, the statute applies to torture, a label that the United
States has repeatedly eschewed, even though the statute’s definition
includes tactics comprising the “enhanced interrogation techniques”
that have been recorded and released by DOD.270 The TVPA defines
torture to include mental pain that is intentionally inflicted for
reasons such as “obtaining . . . information or a confession,” or
“intimidating or coercing that individual.”271 The statute expressly
states that “mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm
caused by or resulting from . . . the administration or application . . .
[of] procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly senses or
personality.”272 Military judges have conceded that this conduct has
occurred, yet they refuse to call the conduct “torture.” Indeed, when
Colonel Stephen R. Henley, the military judge presiding over
detainee Mohammed Jawad’s case, ruled on Jawad’s motion to
dismiss due to torture, Henley wrote,

268. Id. § 2(a).
269. TVPA Signing Statement, supra note 266 (emphasis added).
270. See Beaver Strategies Memorandum, supra note 47; Memorandum from William J.
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., for Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., supra note 70. In
addition, the Bybee Standards Memorandum highlighted certain cases in which courts either
identified the conduct at issue as torture, or found that the allegations of torture were at least
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Conduct similar to that cited as “torture” in the
memorandum was later alleged to have occurred at Guantánamo. See Bybee Standards
Memorandum, supra note 46, at 47–50.
271. TVPA, supra note 267, § 3(1).
272. Id. § 3(b)(2)(B).
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[T]he accused was subjected to the frequent flyer program
and moved from cell to cell 112 times from 7 May 2004 to
20 May 2004, on average of about once every three
hours . . . The Accused was not interrogated and the scheme
was calculated to profoundly disrupt . . . his mental
senses.273
Colonel Henley then denied the motion to dismiss, without formally
ruling on whether Jawad had, in fact, been tortured by U.S.
officials.274
Thus, the U.S. judicial system is categorically unavailable to
Guantánamo detainees who wish to obtain compensation for their
confinement.275 Congress has prevented U.S. courts from exercising
jurisdiction over detainee claims; conduct at Guantánamo cannot
compel a waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA. And
because the conduct is not carried out under the laws of a foreign
country, it does not trigger the TVPA, either. As a result, detainees
have no successful pathway to compensatory relief in federal court.
D. A Proposed Framework for Reform in U.S. Courts
The resulting legal landscape for individuals who are tortured by
the United States and wish to bring a claim in U.S. courts fails to
comply with U.S. obligations under international law. Discussing an

273. United States v. Mohammed Jawad, 1 M.C. 349 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba Sept. 24, 2008) (Ruling on Defense Motion to Dismiss—Torture of the Detainee (D-008)),
available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Ruling%20D-008.pdf. Jawad was not the only
detainee to have been subject to conduct that likely amounted to torture. Mohammed al-Qahtani,
alleged to be the twentieth hijacker, was not recommended for prosecution by military
commission after he was subjected to prolonged isolation and six recorded weeks of four hours of
sleep per day and twenty-hour-a-day interrogations. WORTHINGTON, supra note 16, at 207. The
treatment of detainees at Guantánamo prompted one FBI official to contact the Pentagon, voicing
his concern about one detainee in particular, who is widely accepted to be al-Qahtani. See id. at
206; THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 221. The letter explains that, as early as
November 2002, one detainee (presumed to be al-Qahtani) was “evidencing behavior consistent
with extreme psychological trauma (talking to non-existent people, reportedly hearing voices,
crouching in a corner of the cell covered with a sheet for hours on end).” Letter from T.J.
Harrington, Deputy Assistant Dir., Counterterrorism, FBI, to Major Gen. Donald J. Ryder, Army
Criminal Investigation Command, Suspected Mistreatment of Detainees (July 14, 2004),
available
at
http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/resources/fbi-documents/FBI87_001914%20to
%20001916_DOJFBI001914.pdf.
274. Jawad, 1 M.C. 349.
275. See Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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individual who had been detained in Afghanistan and Iraq, one judge
highlighted the current double standard:
Under the majority’s approach, despite the fact that torture
has long been illegal under United States law, a United
States official who tortures a foreign national in a foreign
country is not subject to suit in an action brought under [the
TVPA], whereas a foreign official who tortures a foreign
national in a foreign country may be sued under [the
TVPA].276
Thus, domestic legal reform is necessary.
1. Violations of a Jus Cogens Norm Should
Waive Sovereign Immunity
In Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,277 the dissenting
judge proposed an approach for compensation that could apply to
Guantánamo litigation. In Princz, the D.C. Circuit held that Hugo
Princz, an American Holocaust survivor, could not sue the German
government to recover for the atrocities he had suffered during
World War II; Princz had been imprisoned at Auschwitz, enslaved at
Birkenau, and forced on the death march from Warsaw to Dachau.278
Although the court acknowledged that the Third Reich violated jus
cogens norms, the court held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA) protected Germany from suit, and that torturing and
enslaving Princz did not constitute an implied waiver of immunity
under the FSIA.279 In reaching its conclusion, the court noted its
aversion to granting jurisdiction for “a claim arising under
international law,” stating that it could disrupt diplomatic relations
between the United States and another sovereign state.280 Moreover,
to grant jurisdiction in Princz would “impute to the Congress an
intention that the federal courts assume jurisdiction over the
countless human rights cases that might well be brought by the

276. Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 789 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Edwards, J., dissenting). After
Kiobel, the Alien Tort Statute may no longer permit the suit. However, with respect to torture, the
TVPA does confer jurisdiction, in accordance with U.S. obligations under the CAT. TVPA, supra
note 267.
277. 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
278. Id.; Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22, 23 (D.D.C. 1992).
279. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174.
280. Id. at 1174 n.1.
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victims of all the ruthless military juntas, presidents-for-life, and
murderous dictators of the world.”281
In her dissent in Princz, however, Judge Wald suggested that jus
cogens norms be held to a higher standard in domestic courts, due to
the heightened status they hold in international law generally.
Rebutting the court’s understanding of congressional intent, Judge
Wald wrote, “Congress did not intend to thwart the opportunity of an
American victim of the Holocaust to have his claims heard by the
United States judicial system.”282 She pointed out the paradox that
the FSIA created, wherein states are bound by jus cogens norms
regardless of their consent to be bound but, under principles of
sovereign immunity, cannot be held liable in a domestic court for
violating these norms unless the state has consented to suit.283 After
tracing the prosecution of jus cogens norms as war crimes arising out
of both the Holocaust and the conflict in former Yugoslavia, Judge
Wald concluded, “[U]nder international law, a state waives its right
to sovereign immunity when it transgresses a jus cogens norm.”284
When a state’s actions are so egregious that it is clear it “might one
day be held accountable for its heinous actions,”285 it cannot use
sovereign immunity to shield itself from liability. “[B]y abdicating
its responsibility to act in accordance with [peremptory norms of
international law],” wrote Judge Wald, “Germany consciously
waived its right to any and all sovereign immunity.”286
Although Judge Wald discussed foreign sovereign immunity, the
logic in her dissent should apply in the domestic legal framework,
justifying a waiver of federal sovereign immunity. Without a waiver,
the United States can rely on sovereign immunity to escape liability
for alleged acts of torture, a process that undermines the force of jus
cogens norms. Additionally, the rationale for denying jurisdiction in
Princz—to protect diplomatic relations with foreign states—is
inapplicable in Guantánamo cases: the United States, not a foreign
country, would be the defendant. Instead, a violation of jus cogens

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id.
Id. at 1185 (Wald, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1181.
Id. at 1183.
Id. at 1184.
Id.
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norms—in this case, torture—should at least reduce a victim’s
barriers to accessing domestic courts.
2. For Guantánamo Detainees, the United States’
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Would Still Not Suffice
to Provide Meaningful Access to U.S. Courts
If violating jus cogens norms waived sovereign immunity,
Guantánamo detainees would still encounter two barriers to
meaningful access in the courts: the jurisdictional bar of § 2241(e)(2)
and the judiciary’s reluctance to effectively overrule the coordinate
federal branches on matters of national security and foreign affairs.
Although § 2241(e)(2)’s jurisdictional bar puts domestic law at odds
with the United States’ international obligations under the CAT,287
the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts defer to the military,
despite well-established precedents affirming the coexistence of
domestic and international law. One early Supreme Court case
explained, “[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.”288 Another Supreme Court decision stated, “International
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions
of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.”289 With respect to § 2241(e)(2), however, Congress
has determined that the “court of appropriate jurisdiction” is not in
the United States,290 a decision that ignores the nation’s obligations
under international law. As long as § 2241(e)(2) is enforced,
Guantánamo detainee litigation will have the same result it does

287. Although the United States declared that the CAT was not self-executing, such a
declaration does not absolve the country of its international obligations. Section 2241(e)(2)
violates Articles 13 and 14 of the CAT, which emphasize the importance of a torture victim’s
access to the courts. Ironically, in a report to the United Nations one year before the jurisdictionstripping provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) and (2) were passed, the United States justified its
decision not to recognize the competence of the CAT Committee. The report explained, “The
United States legal system affords numerous opportunities for individuals to complain of abuse,
and to seek remedies for such alleged violations.” Second Report, supra note 177, para. 163.
288. Alexander Murray, Esq. v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
289. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
290. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (“[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the
detention, transfer, treatment, trial or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was
detained by the United States . . . .”).
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now, even if the United States waives sovereign immunity when jus
cogens norms are violated.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction-stripping statute shields the
Court from being put in a precarious position in which it must either
apply international law in accordance with early canons of
interpretation or invalidate the will of the two coordinate branches.
The latter is a course of action the Court is reluctant to undertake,
particularly with matters pertaining to war and national security.291
Indeed, in his Boumediene dissent, Chief Justice John Roberts
asserted that the majority opinion far overstepped the permissible
limitations of the Court’s judicial review by attempting to implement
policy decisions.292 But Justice Scalia went even further in resisting
the majority’s approach:
The Court today decrees that no good reason to accept the
judgment of the other two branches is “apparent.” . . . What
competence does the Court have to second-guess the
judgment of Congress and the President on such a point?
None whatever. But the Court blunders in nonetheless.
Henceforth, as today’s opinion makes unnervingly clear,
how to handle enemy prisoners in this war will ultimately
lie with the branch that knows least about the national
security concerns that the subject entails.293
Thus, while the outcome in Boumediene may provide hope for
Guantánamo detainees, the Court has yet to indicate whether it will
continue “blundering” down this path, ending its long tradition of
deference in matters of war. Ultimately, a detainee’s success requires
that the United States waive its sovereign immunity and that the
Court finds § 2241(e)(2) violates the nation’s international
obligations—ignoring prudential concerns and overruling the
judgment of the executive and legislative branches. Only then will a
291. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944). See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Judicial Deference, 92 B.U. L.
REV. 89, 96–108 (2012) (tracing the “old judicial deference” of the Court in its pre-9/11 decisions
about war and national security).
292. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 801 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“One cannot
help but think, after surveying the modest practical results of the majority’s ambitious opinion,
that this decision is not really about the detainees at all, but about control of federal policy
regarding enemy combatants.”).
293. Id. at 831 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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detainee be afforded meaningful access to an American court.
Because it is unlikely that these factors will converge, detainees must
seek an alternative avenue for relief.
V. THE SOLE EXISTING OPTION: STATES INVOKE
RESPONSIBILITY ON BEHALF OF THEIR NATIONALS
With detainees unable to independently assert a right to
reparation in U.S. courts, the only possible remedy is for states to
invoke principles of state responsibility and come forward on behalf
of an injured detainee.294 Irrespective of the specific conduct, in
order for a state to invoke the responsibility of another state on an
individual’s behalf, the invoking state must have the right to “bring a
claim” on an individual complainant’s behalf. The doctrine of
diplomatic protection provides a state with “the right to protect its
nationals abroad” by “try[ing] to ensure that another state treats them
in accordance with treaties binding on both states and the minimum
standards for treatment of aliens laid down in customary
international law.”295 Under the doctrine, any wrongful act provides
a state with the right, but not the duty, to protect its nationals.
Diplomatic protection is essential for the detainees at Guantánamo,
who are unable to seek any non-habeas claim296 in any forum.
While the concept of state responsibility is relatively
straightforward, the spectrum of obligations, determined by the
specific unlawful conduct alleged, makes invoking state
responsibility on behalf of Guantánamo detainees more complicated.
294. In light of the Military Order of November 13, 2001, it is possible that even the approach
discussed in this section does not provide a remedy. The military order states, in relevant part:
With respect to any individual subject to this order . . . the individual shall not be
privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to
have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual’s behalf, in (i) any court
of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii)
any international tribunal.
November 13 Military Order, supra note 10, at 57, 835–36. Thus, in the military order,
then-President Bush purported to eliminate the possibility of any detainee challenging his
detention and bringing a claim against the United States. Yet, the validity of this order under
international law is questionable, at best. Moreover, courts seem to have disregarded it in all
of the Guantánamo litigation to date, relying instead on the jurisdictional bar and sovereign
immunity.
295. AUST, supra note 115, at 167.
296. Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In Aamer, the D.C. Circuit found that
a habeas petition permitted a detainee to challenge the conditions of his confinement. Id. While a
major victory for the detainees still at Guantánamo, a habeas petition will not allow a detainee to
seek financial compensation.
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Regardless of whether the conduct constituted a jus cogens norm, a
breach of an obligation erga omnes (or erga omnes partes), or
neither, if an internationally wrongful act was committed, a state can
invoke state responsibility. Jus cogens norms—such as genocide,
slavery, and torture—can never be breached and create an obligation
erga omnes, an obligation owed to all other states in the international
community. For this type of obligation, any state in the international
community can invoke responsibility for a breach, even on behalf of
a non-national. If a state breaches an obligation protecting a specific
group’s collective interest—an obligation erga omnes partes—then
any state within that group can invoke state responsibility. Like an
obligation erga omnes, once an eligible state has established that
there has been a breach of an obligation erga omnes partes, it can do
so on behalf of a non-national. If, however, the conduct does not rise
to either the level of an obligation erga omnes or erga omnes partes,
a detainee must rely on his own state to assert a claim, using the
doctrine of diplomatic protection.
A. Invoking State Responsibility for Conduct That Does
Not Rise to the Level of Jus Cogens
Unlike torture claims, wrongful detention is not a jus cogens
norm, and CID is not widely accepted as a jus cogens norm.297 As a
result, there is a small group of states that can assert a claim on the
detainee’s behalf; when an obligation erga omnes is not implicated,
only the detainee’s state of nationality can invoke state
responsibility.298 Furthermore, of those states that could assert a
claim on behalf of one of their nationals, even fewer are likely
willing to assert such a claim: States that have little clout in the
international community are likely less inclined to confront the
United States for its wrongful acts.
1. Wrongful-Detention Claims
Because the law of war permits countries to detain
combatants299 and civilians (subject to strict rules) until the end of
297. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
298. Draft Articles, supra note 122, art. 42.
299. Geneva III, supra note 29, art. 118. However, this provision is referring to prisoners of
war, a designation not afforded to the individuals at Guantánamo.
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hostilities,300 it may be difficult for a state to argue that the United
States has wrongfully detained individuals and should thus be liable
to make reparation. This is particularly true in light of the CSRT
determinations that most of the Guantánamo detainees were, indeed,
enemy combatants, and the courts’ subsequent treatment of the
CSRTs, despite knowledge of their flaws.301 Claims asserting
violations of CID, on the other hand, appear to be more promising.
Though not a peremptory norm, CID is prohibited in multiple
treaties, including the CAT.302 Further, Common Article 3 provides
that “those placed hors de combat by . . . detention . . . shall in all
cases be treated humanely,” and that “cruel treatment and torture,” as
well as “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating
and degrading treatment” are prohibited.303 While the prohibition
against CID in the CAT could arguably be displaced by the law of
armed conflict (lex specialis),304 the inclusion of standards for
treatment of detainees in the Geneva Conventions—namely
Common Article 3—indicate that CID is not permitted under the law
of war.305 Still, the Geneva Conventions do not provide a private
right of action. Therefore, if a detainee relies on Common Article 3
to demonstrate a violation of the law of war and seek reparation, a
detainee can succeed only if his state of nationality invokes the
responsibility of the United States.
2. CID Claims
While it is theoretically easier to assert violations of CID than
claims for wrongful detention, two challenges remain for individuals
who would like their states to invoke state responsibility. First, the
300. Geneva IV, supra note 119, art. 133 (permitting internment but stating that “[i]nternment
shall cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities”).
301. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Al Janko v. Gates, 831 F. Supp. 2d
272 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 741 F.3d 136 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
302. While it seems as though CID is an obligation erga omnes partes to all states party to the
CAT, and in fact, the ICJ recently concluded that it was an obligation erga omnes partes, the text
of the treaty itself does not provide any state the right to invoke responsibility. On the contrary,
the CAT provides states with the right to report to the Committee. This Article proceeds by
examining the invocation of state responsibility for violations of CID in both instances—as an
ordinary obligation and as an obligation erga omnes partes.
303. Geneva III, supra note 29, art. 3, art. 1(a), art. 1(c).
304. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
305. Geneva III, supra note 29, art. 3. With respect to detention at Guantánamo, if the CAT
falls short, Common Article 3, which prohibits CID, even during war, can provide the needed
safeguard.
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United States’ reservations to the CAT (and other treaties involving
the term “CID”) limits the applicable definition to mean the
treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.306 When the treatment of detainees violated
this standard, U.S. officials have been reluctant to admit misconduct
at Guantánamo and have historically done so only in response to
leaked or declassified documents.307 Moreover, it is difficult to
speculate whether the United States would concede CID even under
the definitions presented in its reservations, since such claims
have yet to be successfully asserted and upheld because of
jurisdiction-stripping statutes.
A second barrier to a detainee’s victory on a CID claim under
state responsibility is the dependence on the state of nationality. If
the CAT does not create an obligation erga omnes partes to prohibit
CID, then each detainee’s state must exercise its right under the
diplomatic-protection doctrine to invoke responsibility. This poses a
clear problem for those detainees whose states are unwilling to assert
a claim. Indeed, many released detainees have been repatriated to
third countries, “either because their home country would not accept
them or because the United States believed the home country might
subject them to torture or other abuses.”308 Practical difficulties—
jurisdiction-stripping statutes in the United States and the lack of a
private right of action stemming from international treaties—prevent
a detainee from asserting his own claim. As a result, if the CAT does
not create an obligation erga omnes partes, a detainee whose state is
unwilling to invoke state responsibility will be left without recourse
for the treatment he endured. On the other hand, if the CAT does
create an obligation erga omnes partes, then any state party to the
CAT can invoke state responsibility on behalf of a detainee. Indeed,
a recent ICJ opinion seems to suggest a shifting trend toward
recognizing the CAT as creating an obligation erga omnes partes,309
306. CAT Reservations, supra note 171, at I.(1); see supra Part III.D.2.
307. Compare, e.g., Bybee Standards Memorandum, supra note 46, with Revised Standards
Memorandum, supra note 61.
308. Max Fisher, Kafka at Gitmo: Why 86 Prisoners Are Cleared for Release but Might Never
Get It, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013
/04/25/kafka-at-gitmo-why-86-prisoners-are-cleared-for-release-but-might-never-get-it/.
309. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment,
2012 I.C.J. 449, ¶ 68 (July 20, 2012).
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an interpretation that would be immensely favorable to detainees
seeking reparation. Nonetheless, unlike a breach of jus cogens
norms, for which there are no defenses, the United States would be
able to assert defenses for breaching an obligation erga omnes
partes.
B. Invoking State Responsibility for
Violations of Jus Cogens Norms
Many of the barriers to a successful invocation of state
responsibility under a CID or wrongful-detention claim do not exist
for allegations of torture because torture is a jus cogens norm, and
thus an obligation erga omnes. If a state wishes to invoke state
responsibility for the breach of a peremptory norm of international
law, the breach must be a “serious breach,” meaning it “involves a
gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil[l] the
obligation.”310 The International Law Commission commentary
indicates that a “gross” failure “denotes violations of a flagrant
nature, amounting to a direct and outright assault on the values
protected by the rule.”311 Additionally, to be considered
“systematic,” “a violation would have to be carried out in an
organized and deliberate way.”312 Factors indicating that a violation
is serious include “[t]he intent to violate the norm; the scope and
number of individual violations; and the gravity of their
consequences for the victims.”313 Once there is a serious breach of a
peremptory norm, any state can invoke the wrongful state’s
responsibility.314 An eligible state can then require that the wrongful
state pay reparation “in the interest of the injured State or of the
beneficiaries of the obligation breached.”315
In light of all the evidence, a state could make a good argument
against the United States for a “serious breach” of the prohibition
against torture. After all, while the intent to torture was never
specifically stated, the intent to engage in conduct that, in fact,
amounts to torture (i.e., waterboarding, sleep deprivation, sensory

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Draft Articles, supra note 122, art. 40, commentary para. 2.
Id. art. 40, commentary para. 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 48.
Id.
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deprivation) is well documented.316 As such, any state could invoke
the United States’ responsibility for torture on behalf of any detainee,
even when that detainee is not a national of the invoking state. While
this method is limited to individuals who can allege that they were
tortured under the definition in the CAT, it is especially important for
individuals whose countries either will not recognize them or refuse
to invoke state responsibility.
Thus, under principles of state responsibility, a detainee who can
demonstrate that he suffered torture has the greatest range of options
available to seek compensation.317 Because torture is a jus cogens
norm, the obligation to refrain from torture is an obligation erga
omnes. For detainees who were tortured at Guantánamo, either their
state of nationality or any other state in the international community
can invoke the responsibility of the United States for its
internationally wrongful act, and successful invocation would require
the United States to make reparation. For claims of CID that do not
rise to the level of torture, a detainee’s options are more limited. If
the prohibition against CID is an obligation erga omnes partes,
governed by the CAT, it can be invoked by any state party to the
treaty. However, if it is a simple obligation, owed individually to a
state under the CAT or under Common Article 3, then only the
detainee’s state of nationality can invoke the United States’
responsibility. While no scenario presents an easy way to invoke
state responsibility, the current state of the law precludes any other
option for detainees to effectively seek a remedy.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United
States selected the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, as the
site to detain some of the men and boys captured overseas. Some
detainees have been released and either repatriated or sent to a third
316. See WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR
ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS (2003), available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127
/03.04.04.pdf; Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., to Donald
Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., supra note 70; Beaver Strategies Memorandum, supra note 47.
317. Of course, in the absence of a claim—or a forum to have such a claim heard—the
“greatest range of options” refers purely to the number of states that could invoke the United
States’ responsibility.
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country. Others remain at Guantánamo, cleared for release but
waiting indefinitely. And U.S. laws—some enacted before
September 11, others enacted when the terrorist attacks were a recent
memory—provide little legal protection to those who have been at
Guantánamo. After more than twelve years, the only detainee claim
over which Article III courts can exercise original jurisdiction is a
petition for habeas corpus. Federal courts are barred from hearing
any other claim brought by a Guantánamo detainee.
But selecting Guantánamo as the location where the “worst of
the worst” would be detained does not discharge the United States’
obligations under international law, even when the law of war
permits some deviation. No matter the circumstances, the United
States may never engage in torture. Even if the alleged conduct at
Guantánamo—sleep deprivation, physical beatings, prolonged
temperature manipulation, sensory deprivation, threats of sexual
abuse—does not rise to the level of torture, such conduct may violate
the law of war’s prohibition against cruel, humiliating, and degrading
treatment found in the Geneva Conventions, as well as the
prohibition on CID found in the CAT, to which the United States is a
party.
Because detainees cannot assert a claim against the United
States themselves, they must rely on other states—either their own or
other states affected by the violation—to invoke state responsibility.
And if a state succeeds, the United States must make reparation
accordingly, through restitution, compensation, and satisfaction.
Because of the long-lasting physical and psychological effects of
years at Guantánamo, mere restitution cannot possibly suffice.
Simply releasing detainees will neither return the years they spent at
Guantánamo, nor make them whole.
Another possibility—albeit an idealistic one—would be for the
United States to unilaterally opt to compensate detainees. For the
detainees who may have been subjected to torture, the obligations are
fairly clear. But detainees who suffered maltreatment that did not rise
to the level of torture must not be forgotten. Through careful drafting
of interrogation policies, U.S. officials evaded the scope of the
nation’s international obligations prohibiting CID. Such conduct
cannot be condoned, nor should the victims be left without remedy.
Compensation for the former Guantánamo detainees is required.
But what amount of money will restore years of captivity and abuse?
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Is it $20,000, the amount paid to Japanese Americans who were
interned during World War II?318 Is it “at least $40,000 each,” the
amount suggested that Japan pay to the comfort women of World
War II?319 Or $2.37 million each, the amount proposed by the U.S.
Senate bill for each American hostage from the 1979–81 Iran
Hostage Crisis?320 Or perhaps the United States could follow the
United Kingdom’s lead, paying every sixteen detainees a settlement
totaling “millions of dollars”; would that be enough?321
In 1995, American Holocaust survivor Hugo Princz, whose
lawsuits against Germany were dismissed due to sovereign
immunity, finally received financial compensation. The settlement
reached between the United States and Germany provided $2.1
million, shared among Princz and eleven others.322 Of Hugo Princz’s
story and the final settlement, U.S. Senator Bill Bradley told the
Senate:
Finally, yesterday, 50 years after the formal end of World
War II and the formal liberation of the concentration camp
prisoners, Hugo Princz made his own peace and accepted a
settlement. It is not enough in dollar terms. Indeed, no
amount of money could ever compensate Hugo Princz for
his suffering—both during the war and during his quest for
reparations. But by accepting German[y]’s settlement, Hugo
Princz has vindicated his life of courage. He has won
recognition of the justice of his cause.323
Certainly the fog of war can complicate “justice.” But the United
States’ international obligations mandate adherence to the law. To
ensure that it can secure justice for future Americans who are
mistreated by other countries—as it did with Hugo Princz, the United
States must honor its obligations. The United States must take the
necessary and proper steps to remedy the harms it may have caused.

318. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-383, 102 Stat. 905.
319. H.R. Con. Res. 357, 106th Cong. (2000).
320. Justice for Former American Hostages in Iran Act of 2013, S. 559, 113th Cong. (2013);
Justice for the American Diplomats Held Hostage in Tehran Act, H.R. 904, 113th Cong. (2013);
ELSEA, supra note 221.
321. Stobart, supra note 87.
322. Martin, supra note 218.
323. 141 CONG. REC. 13,870 (1995).
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